Ethno‐nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment

Abstract

Scholarly and journalistic accounts of the recent successes of radical‐right politics in Europe and the United States, including the Brexit referendum and the Trump campaign, tend to conflate three phenomena: populism, ethno‐nationalism and authoritarianism. While all three are important elements of the radical right, they are neither coterminous nor limited to the right. The resulting lack of analytical clarity has hindered accounts of the causes and consequences of ethno‐nationalist populism. To address this problem, I bring together existing research on nationalism, populism and authoritarianism in contemporary democracies to precisely define these concepts and examine temporal patterns in their supply and demand, that is, politicians’ discursive strategies and the corresponding public attitudes. Based on the available evidence, I conclude that both the supply and demand sides of radical politics have been relatively stable over time, which suggests that in order to understand public support for radical politics, scholars should instead focus on the increased resonance between pre‐existing attitudes and discursive frames. Drawing on recent research in cultural sociology, I argue that resonance is not only a function of the congruence between a frame and the beliefs of its audience, but also of shifting context. In the case of radical‐right politics, a variety of social changes have engendered a sense of collective status threat among national ethnocultural majorities. Political and media discourse has channelled such threats into resentments toward elites, immigrants, and ethnic, racial and religious minorities, thereby activating previously latent attitudes and lending legitimacy to radical political campaigns that promise to return power and status to their aggrieved supporters. Not only does this form of politics threaten democratic institutions and inter‐group relations, but it also has the potential to alter the contours of mainstream public discourse, thereby creating the conditions of possibility for future successes of populist, nationalist, and authoritarian politics.

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“…But in other parts of the world, like India, exclusionary nationalist populists have consolidated their power. The broader concern is that these populist regimes have legitimized and mobilized a nationalism hostile to ethnic minorities that could outlive their political tenures (Bonikowski 2017 : 547).…”

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“…In the literature, the concepts of nationalism and populism have long being contested (Menon, 2017). More recently, Bonikowski (2017) has argued that in reductively labelling the recent surge in support for the radical right as populism, an unintended effect is to underplay two other key phenomena, that of ethno‐nationalism and authoritarianism. Virdee & McGeever (2018) finely portray the racialising nationalism in populist Britain, providing a conjunctural analysis of the financial and political crisis during the Brexit period.…”