Ethnic quotas and ethnic representation worldwide

Abstract

This article makes theoretical and empirical contributions towards understanding the form and function of ethnic quotas that are applied in various countries around the world. It advances a classification scheme for sorting through the broad variation in these electoral mechanisms. Initial exploration suggests that variation among ethnic quota schemes corresponds more with regime type, and less with differences in ethnic demography. Nevertheless, particular rules do operate differently in relation to ethnic diversity and inter-group conflict. Different rules also appear to have an impact on representational dynamics, including the capacity of minority ethnic representatives to exercise legislative influence on matters of concern to their community.

Reserved Seats, Political Parties, and Minority Representation

“…The literature on minority quotas (including reservations) is a lot less extensive, leaving these institutions 'little understood' in general (Bird, 2014, p. 12). Whereas a range of contributions aim to provide systematic classifications of the universe of cases (Bird, 2014;Krook & O'Brien, 2010;Meier, 2009;Reynolds, 2005;Vukelic, 2012) few studies analyse the causal effects of reservations on representation or other outcomes, such as democratic stability and minority empowerment (for the latter, see Lončar, in press). The literature investigating the impact of reserved seats on substantive representation to a large extent consists of studies taking advantage of sub-national variation in India and applying a distributive operationalisation of acting in the minority interest, be it in terms of public goods or private transfers.…”

Political Representation of Minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Reserved Seats Affect Minority Representatives’ Influence on Decision-making and Perceived Substantive Representation

“…municipal) level because examining the effects of reserved seats in local assemblies allows us to control for a range of features associated with the design of the reserved seats and the political system of the state, while party affiliation and government participation of minority representatives varies across selected municipalities. As already noted, since reserved seats models vary considerably between countries, a sub-national comparison is methodologically the only sound solution (Bird, 2014). Reserved seats for national minorities in local assemblies in BiH were introduced by amendments to the Electoral Law of Bosnia andHerzegovina, first in 2004 andthen in 2008.…”

“…Empirical studies so far have looked mostly at the effects of reserved seats at the state level. Dynamics at the level of 'micro factors', such as the territorial concentration of minority population, the intensity of minorities' political mobilization, interaction with other ethnic minority groups, as well as individual candidates' characteristics and their ties to a given community have rarely been analysed (Bird, 2014). Most studies on reserved seats for minority populations (according to caste) in local assemblies in India have explored the potential socio-economic benefits that this particular participatory mechanism might have for the disadvantaged groups.…”

“…These cases provide rather favourable conditions to examine the effect of reserved seats for three principal reasons: (1) the sub-national comparison circumvents issues with institutional rules for filling the reserved seats, which differ substantially between countries (Bird, 2014); (2) a relatively recent introduction of reserved seats, in 2008, and the fact that the seats were introduced in a limited number of cases allows both a diachronic comparison of the influence on decisionmaking before and after the introduction of reserved seats within the same municipality, as well as comparisons between municipalities that have and those that have not introduced reserved seats; (3) with regard to our second question, different minority representative configurations: independent candidates, members of multi-ethnic parties, ethnic parties appealing to the minority in question and ethnic parties appealing to another ethnic group-all of which may be observed in the Bosnian case-secure a variance needed for examining effects of different configurations. Thus, in addition to broadening our understanding of the effect of reserved seats on minority representation more generally, the article yields original insight about a case that has so far received limited scholarly attention.…”

Why Are Representational Guarantees Adopted for Women and Minorities? Comparing Constituency Formation and Electoral Quota Design Within Countries

“…Meier [2004]; Murray, Krook & Opello [2012]) or quotas for minorities (e.g., Bird [2014]; Reynolds [2005Reynolds [ , 2011; Lublin & Wright [2013]). We thus know relatively little about the potentially different underlying motives for ensuring the political inclusion of different groups.…”