Ethics, Public Policy, and Global Warming

Jamieson, Dale

doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262017534.003.0010

Cited by 37 publications

(55 citation statements)

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“…The justice dilemmas embedded in decision-making about climate change policy have been well identified by a range of scholars (Shue, 1992(Shue, , 1993Jamieson, 1992Jamieson, , 2005Rose et al, 1998;Blanchard et al, 2001;Grubb, 1995;Howarth and Monahan, 1996;Tol, 2001;Tonn, 2003;Ikeme, 2003;Gardiner, 2004;Ott, 2004;Singer, 2006). Despite these ongoing discussions, no single framework of justice has emerged as the rule for dividing the burden of mitigation (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi, 2009), nor is one likely, or potentially even desirable (Mü ller, 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…To some extent distributive justice questions raised by climate change have been debated in policy (Rose et al, 1998;Blanchard et al, 2001;Grubb, 1995;Tol, 2001;Tonn, 2003) and philosophy communities (Shue, 1992(Shue, , 1993Jamieson, 1992Jamieson, , 2005Singer, 2006;Caney, 2005;Page, 2007), but empirical work exploring public perceptions of justice in this context has been lacking. This is problematic because public input is particularly important for several reasons in this context.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Comparing public rationales for justice trade-offs in mitigation and adaptation climate policy dilemmas

Klinsky

Dowlatabadi

McDaniels

2012

Global Environmental Change

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Comparing public rationales for justice trade-offs in mitigation and adaptation climate policy dilemmas

Klinsky

Dowlatabadi

McDaniels

2012

Global Environmental Change

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“…20 Pour Jamieson, le changement climatique concerne « la façon dont nous devrions vivre et dont les humains devraient se comporter avec leurs semblables et le reste de la nature ». 21 La nature du problème se trouve, selon lui, dans le système de valeurs de nos sociétés occidentales, notamment dans nos conceptions de l'intérêt personnel, de l'éthique et de la justice internationale. 22 Pour ne s'en tenir qu'à notre conception de la moralité, le changement climatique remet en question notre manière de concevoir le principe classique de non-nuisance : tandis que nous avons l'habitude de détecter des torts moraux dans les situations où un individu inflige une nuisance intentionnelle et identifiable à un autre individu, proche dans l'espace et le temps, dans le cas du changement climatique, la nuisance est involontaire, difficile à identifier, diffuse dans l'espace et le temps, et d'origine collective.…”

Section: Les Limites De L'éthique Des Vertus : L'exemple De Dale Jamiunclassified

Éthique et justice climatique : entre motivations morales et amorales

André¹,

Bourban

2016

Les ateliers de l'éthique

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Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation.In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation

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“…Other frameworks presented in the literature include those based on rights (Adger 2004;Caney 2008) and virtue (Jamieson 1992). Some major issues include how much emissions reductions to aim for (Baum 2007;Tol 2008), how to distribute permissions to emit (Neumayer 2000), how to handle uncertainty about the climate-society system (Brown 2003), and how to help humans and ecosystems adapt to what climatic changes will inevitably occur (Adger et al 2006;UNDP 2007).…”

Section: Climate Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate Change: Evidence of Human Causes and Arguments for Emissions Reduction

2011

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In a recent editorial, Raymond Spier expresses skepticism over claims that climate change is driven by human actions and that humanity should act to avoid climate change. This paper responds to this skepticism as part of a broader review of the science and ethics of climate change. While much remains uncertain about the climate, research indicates that observed temperature increases are human-driven. Although opinions vary regarding what should be done, prominent arguments against action are based on dubious factual and ethical positions. Thus, the skepticisms in the recent editorial are unwarranted. This does not diminish the general merits of skeptical intellectual inquiry.

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Ethics, Public Policy, and Global Warming

Cited by 37 publications

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Comparing public rationales for justice trade-offs in mitigation and adaptation climate policy dilemmas

Comparing public rationales for justice trade-offs in mitigation and adaptation climate policy dilemmas

Éthique et justice climatique : entre motivations morales et amorales

Climate Change: Evidence of Human Causes and Arguments for Emissions Reduction

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