Ethics, Not Objects

Abstract

Posthumanist or new materialist tools, positions and conversations contain some useful ideas for archaeologists to think with, but others that I find deeply problematic. In this opinion piece, I organize my thoughts around three posthumanist ‘turns’ to objects and materials, relations and assemblages, and non-human animacy. I appreciate how some strands of Posthumanism can help us think more creatively and thoughtfully about relations between humans and non-humans, but I argue against non-anthropocentrism, flat ontology and symmetrical archaeology. Animacy and perspectivism can help remedy colonialist and late-stage capitalist destructive forces, but archaeologists should take care not simply to appropriate, patronize, or re-colonize non-western thinkers. Ultimately, I argue, we should not need continental philosophy to remind us to care about one other, all living creatures and the well-being of our shared planet. What is needed today are ethics, not convoluted turns toward objects.

Archaeological encounters: Ethics and aesthetics under the mark of the Anthropocene

“…As should be evident, the frictions between Modernist and posthumanist ontological discourses are fundamental, and in whatever way one chooses to define the radicalness of these ontologies, they have resulted in heated debates and criticism across the dividing lines. The critique of posthumanism goes in different directions, but we see it as revolving mainly around three general points (based on Andersen and Jacobsen 2020; Boysen 2018; Cipolla 2017; Cole 2013; Díaz de Liaño and Fernández-Götz 2021; Fernández-Götz, Maschek and Roymans 2020; Hacıgüzeller 2021; Hamilton 2017; Hornborg 2017a; 2017b; Ion 2018; Kristiansen 2022; Lindstrøm 2015; McGuire 2021a; 2021b; Rekret 2016; 2018; Ribeiro 2016; 2019; 2022; Ribeiro and Wollentz 2020; Van Dyke 2021; Vetlesen 2019). First, critics have claimed that reliance on the notion of object agency eradicates human responsibility .…”

“…Elsewhere, similar criticisms have been voiced, arguing that severe environmental challenges require fast and robust solutions rather than aesthetics, poetry and lyrical meditations (e.g. Ion 2018; Van Dyke 2021), or plain ‘terminological incontinence’ to cite Hamilton’s dismissal of Haraway (Hamilton 2017, 92). In many respects, these criticisms echo earlier charges made against phenomenological approaches for enticing ‘cancerous semantic growths’ (Gellner 1975, 445) that would hamper the possibility for well-defined concepts and meanings, ‘because the slapdash, wilfully obscure and undisciplined verbosity makes it impossible to be sure just precisely what it is that is being said’ (Gellner 1975, 446).…”

Outline of a theory of breakage

“…For many archaeologists this question is crucial (Barrett, 2016; Brück, 2019; Fowles, 2010: 23; Hodder, 2014: 229; Liaño and Fernández-Götz, 2021; Lucas, 2015: 191; Ribeiro, 2016; Thomas, 2015: 191; Van Dyke, 2015: 18), as it remains difficult to envision an archaeology, let alone an anthropology without any idea about humans. For some, this ‘dehumanisation’ holds ethical consequences, particularly in legal frameworks, e.g., in a gunshot murder can the shooter and the gun be considered equally responsible (Dyke, 2021: 489)? Thus, much concern revolves around the lack of engagement with social inequalities, power relations, ethics, among other more traditional subjects of study (also discussed in Fernández-Götz et al 2021).…”

Why Matter Matters: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Relevance of New Materialism

“…How do we reconcile, for example, the idea of flat ontology with the existence of privilege and inequality? 84 Relatedly, how do we talk about flat ontology when the effects and dynamics of key processes that are fundamentally shaping the world we live in, such as climate change and globalisation, are the very opposite of 'flat'? 85 Another set of concerns is that flat ontology leaves dangerous loopholes, in the sense of detracting from harms caused by human activities -and thereby diluting responsibility for those harms.…”

“…86 Van Dyke, for example, asserts that 'If we are only interested in charting relationships among entities, and we consider people no more important than any other entities in the network, then we have no logical means by which we can hold perpetrators of violence and suffering to be accountable for their actions'. 87 Significant questions have been asked, therefore, about the practical utility of a flat ontology that treats human and non-human actors equally, without recognising 'the distinctive properties/powers that human beings possess' 88 -and about the 'naiveté' of conflating agencies that are manifestly very different (e.g. the agency of an animal and the agency of a human).…”