Ethics and Action Theory

Abstract

This chapter compares the general form and state of moral philosophy during the first half of the twentieth century (section 21.1) to how it stands today (section 21.3). These two overviews serve as the bread of a GEMA-filled sandwich. Section 21.2 accordingly considers Anscombe’s criticisms of ‘modern moral philosophy’ from Sidgwick to Ross. Anyone in sympathy with the general line of her criticisms must concede that the state of moral philosophy was in far better shape in the decades before she wrote her seminal 1958 paper than it has been ever since. Ironically, contemporary moral philosophy has become what it is partly due to Anscombe’s own unintended role in influencing (i) the formation of ‘virtue theory’ as yet another position within normative ethics and (ii) the fashioning of ‘moral psychology’ as an altogether distinct—and increasingly empirical— branch of moral philosophy.