Ethical Limitations on the State's Use of Arational Persuasion

Abstract

Policy makers frequently use arational appeals and nudges—such as those relying on emotion, cognitive biases, and subliminal messaging—to persuade citizens to adopt behaviors that support public goals. However, these communication tactics have been widely criticized for relying on arational triggers rather than reasoned argument. This article develops a fuller account of the nonconsequentialist objection to arational persuasion by state actors, focusing on theories of decisional autonomy and metadecisional voluntariness. The article concludes by proposing ethically justifiable limitations on state communications that should be compelling to both critics and advocates of arational persuasion.

Nudge in perspective: A systematic literature review on the ethical issues with nudging

“…Barton (2013) argues that unwilling smokers can be made more autonomous by nudging them away from smoking because it improves their ability for self-rule. Sawicki states that the irrational influence of nudges can still enhance one’s autonomy if the nudge helps to override unwanted “internal or external hindrances” (Sawicki, 2016: 223). Engelen (2019a) argues that in those situations, process rationality (agency) is sacrificed for outcome rationality (self-constitution).…”

“…Public deliberation is defined by Martin as the capacity of “citizens in a democracy to know and understand the moral and political problems that define their common lives” (Martin, 2015: 452). Martin, Sawicki (2016), Button (2018) and Ewert (2019a) all argue that nudges frustrate this ‘civic’ capacity, as nudges focus on irrational persuasion, diverting citizens from deliberation, ultimately undermining public discourse Gumbert (2019) applies this critique to food policies by arguing that citizens should participate in democratic deliberation about food policies. Nudges prevent this, as they nudge citizens to behave in line with governmental policies rather than inviting citizens to reflect on them.…”

A döntési helyzetek tudatos tervezésének háttere. A nudge fogalma, módszerei és kritikái

“…Noha a meggyőzés, manipuláció és kényszerítés kategóriáit többen próbálták szétválasztani, a szakirodalomban a definíciók skálája meglehetősen széles spektrumon mozog, és hasonlóan színes palettával találkozunk, ha az autonómia fogalmát szeretnénk definiálni (Sawicki, 2016;Saghai, 2013). A kanti morálfilozófiai értelmezés szerint az autonóm döntések értéke nem a döntések következménye-itől, hanem a döntésektől maguktól, illetve a döntéshozó szándékától függ.…”

Debiasing regulators

“…One of the main controversies swirling around regulatory regimes that have been informed by behavioral economics is the allegation that they tend toward a ‘soft paternalism’ (Friedman, 2011: 547), incompatible with the constitutional rights and autonomy of citizens (see Sawicki, 2016; Yeung, 2016). Behaviorally designed regulation has also been criticized for paying insufficient attention to self-interested regulators deploying behavioral public policies against the public interest, in favor of well-organized special interests (Tullock et al, 2002), and to the fact that administrators suffer from same biases and heuristics that characterize citizens (Congdon et al, 2011; Hirshleifer, 2008).…”