Ethical Intuitionism and the Emotions: Toward an Empirically Adequate Moral Sense Theory

Sias, James

doi:10.1007/s10790-014-9427-z

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Emotional Sensitivity: Virtuous agents tend to respond to morally significant objects with emotions that fit their moral status. This understanding of virtuous agents' sensitivity is in line with historical views such as those of Aristotle [44], Mengzi [45], and Francis Hutcheson [46], as well as some more recent work [47][48][49].…”

Section: From Perception To Emotionsupporting

confidence: 78%

See 1 more Smart Citation

What Attentional Moral Perception Cannot Do but Emotions Can

Hutton

2023

Philosophies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Jonna Vance and Preston Werner argue that humans’ mechanisms of perceptual attention tend to be sensitive to morally relevant properties. They dub this tendency “Attentional Moral Perception” (AMP) and argue that it can play all the explanatory roles that some theorists have hoped moral perception can play. In this article, I argue that, although AMP can indeed play some important explanatory roles, there are certain crucial things that AMP cannot do. Firstly, many theorists appeal to moral perception to explain how moral knowledge is possible. I argue that AMP cannot put an agent in a position to acquire moral knowledge unless it is supplemented with some other capacity for becoming aware of moral properties. Secondly, theorists appeal to moral perception to explain “moral conversions”, i.e., cases in which an experience leads an agent to form a moral belief that conflicts with her pre-existing moral beliefs. I argue that AMP cannot explain this either. Due to these shortcomings, theorists should turn to emotions for a powerful and psychologically realistic account of virtuous agents’ sensitivity to the moral landscape.

show abstract

Section: From Perception To Emotionsupporting

confidence: 78%

“…14 Compare [48,55]. See Ernest Sosa [56] and John Greco [57] for virtue-reliabilist accounts of knowledge.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What Attentional Moral Perception Cannot Do but Emotions Can

Hutton

2023

Philosophies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Vanwege de emotionele dimensie van liefde, ondersteunt dit inzicht volgens hem dat er redenen voor de liefde kunnen zijn. Emoties spelen een belangrijke rol bij het ervaren van waarden (Deigh 2009, Sias 2014. Vertrouwen kan bijvoorbeeld niet zonder affect.…”

Section: １unclassified

Ware liefde zonder uniciteit: goede redenen voor romantische liefde

Hindriks

2015

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Wijsbegeerte

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

True Love Without Uniqueness: Good Reasons for Romantic LoveLove involves emotions, and emotions are things that happen to us. So how can love be true? Love can be true only if people can have reasons for loving someone. I explore the tension between these two thoughts and propose a way of resolving it. I argue that reasons for romantic love are not limited to the other person’s properties, not even when relational properties such as a common sense of humour are included. A full-blown romantic relation provides relation-dependent reasons that derive from the values that are realized within the relationship. These include trust, vulnerability and intimacy. True love is justified in part by such relation-dependent reasons. How this is consistent with the emotional dimension of love becomes clear once it is appreciated that people can have reasons for the emotions they experience. As this is not always recognized, the mystery of love is sometimes overrated. I end by discussing whether true love must be unique in the sense of being limited to one particular person. I argue that true love need not be combined with the norms of monogamy, but is consistent with those of polyamory.

show abstract

Emotions and Their Expressions

Sias¹,

Bar‐On²

2016

The Expression of Emotion

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a well-known paper, Rosalind Hursthouse argues that certain common, and not irrational, actions cannot be accommodated by the dominant philosophical model of the rational explanation of action. Although there is no rational explanation, she claims, there is a good explanation for such action: they are done out of emotion. In this paper I argue that we can reject Hursthouse's conclusion that explanation of action as the expression of emotion is sui generis if we have a sufficiently broad understanding of how features can count in favour of actions. What is distinctive about expressive acts, I will argue, is not that they are spontaneous products of the 'overflowing of powerful feeling,' requiring a form of explanation that is arational, but rather that they are done intentionally but for their own sake as a constitutive part of doing justice to one's sense of the gravity (or indeed levity) of a situation. The action is not arational, but can be assessed for its expressive adequacy. Furthermore, the expressive action, on this view, has a purpose -that of doing justice, or giving adequate external form to one's sense of the situation.If there are reasons sometimes simply to acknowledge or honour the gravity of a situation then we can reconcile expressive action with the standard picture of rational explanation of action.

show abstract

Ethical Intuitionism and the Emotions: Toward an Empirically Adequate Moral Sense Theory

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

What Attentional Moral Perception Cannot Do but Emotions Can

What Attentional Moral Perception Cannot Do but Emotions Can

Ware liefde zonder uniciteit: goede redenen voor romantische liefde

Emotions and Their Expressions

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About