Estimating the size of the potential market for the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms

Abstract

Q28, Q25, Q48, Q43,

Interregional burden-sharing of greenhouse gas mitigation in the United States

“…Nations as parties to a global agreement, or regions and individual emitters within a nation when implementation reaches that stage, are unlikely to be convinced of the worthiness of a policy solely on the basis of an abstract goal such as overall efficiency, from which their individual well-being is derivative. 1 They are more likely to be favorably disposed toward a policy that explicitly considers their own welfare and its relation to others Zhang, 2000aZhang, , 2001. Features of the tradeable permit instrument enable policymakers to address international or interregional equity head on, and in a manner that does not undercut efficiency, through the initial permit distribution .…”

Towards an Effective Implementation of CDM Projects in China

“…Many economic modelling studies indicate that China is expected to emerge as the world's number one host country of CDM projects (e.g., Zhang, 1999Zhang, , 2000Zhang, , 2001Zhang, , 2004a. But a general lack of awareness by both the Chinese government and business communities may cause China to not fully exploit its potential for CDM projects.…”

Why has China not embraced a global cap-and-trade regime?

“…In practice, CDM investment is most likely to be a climate component added to existing and future FDI (foreign direct investment) projects. Even in the optimistic case where the U.S. was engaged in the Kyoto Protocol, the total inflow of CDM investment in China in 2010 would be estimated to be a value of US$ 1.7 billion even in the optimistic case of full global emissions trading (Zhang, 2000). This is only few percentage of the current total FDI in China, which is now about US$ 60 billion.…”

“…That explains why many economic studies by Zhang (2000 and2004) and those examined by Stanford University's Energy Modeling Forum (Weyant, 1999) show that China would reap significant benefits from participating in a global cap-and-trade regime. Even if such a regime is so beneficial to China, why has China consistently refused in international negotiations even to discuss its participation in it?…”

“…Developing countries regard their emissions as survival emissions and those from Annex 1 countries as luxury emissions. Many economic studies (Weyant, 1999;Zhang, 2000 and2004) Löschel and Zhang (2002). 1 Significant sinks credits allowed in the Marrakech Accords relax the emissions targets substantially.…”