Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism and Normative Supervenience

Toppinen, Teemu

doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9456-x

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 13 publications

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“…I will not pursue this issue here, however. For critique of Leary's proposal, see Faraci (2017) and Toppinen (2018).…”

Section: Essentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-Naturalism and Reasons-Firstism: How to Solve the Discontinuity Problem by Reducing Two Queerness Worries to One

Moberger

2021

J Ethics

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A core tenet of metanormative non-naturalism is that genuine or robust normativity—i.e., the kind of normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements, and perhaps also of prudential, epistemic and even aesthetic requirements—is metaphysically special in a way that rules out naturalist analyses or reductions; on the non-naturalist view, the normative is sui generis and metaphysically discontinuous with the natural (or descriptive or non-normative). Non-naturalists agree, however, that the normative is modally as well as explanatorily dependent on the natural. These two commitments—discontinuity and dependence—at least initially pull in opposite directions, and one of the central challenges to non-naturalism is how to reconcile them. In this paper I spell out the most pressing version of this discontinuity problem, as I propose to call it, and I go on to offer a novel solution. Drawing on the ideology of reasons-firstism, I formulate an account of normative explanation which reconciles the two commitments, and I argue that competing accounts either do not solve the problem or are implausible on independent grounds.

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“…I will not pursue this issue here, however. For critique of Leary's proposal, see Faraci (2017) and Toppinen (2018).…”

Section: Essentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-Naturalism and Reasons-Firstism: How to Solve the Discontinuity Problem by Reducing Two Queerness Worries to One

Moberger

2021

J Ethics

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New frontiers in ground, essence, and modality: introduction

O’Conaill

Tahko

2018

Synthese

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Ground, essence, and modality seem to have something to do with each other. Can we provide unified foundations for ground and essence, or should we treat each as primitives? Can modality be grounded in essence, or should essence be expressed in terms of modality? Does grounding entail necessitation? Are the notions of ground and essence univocal? This volume focuses on the links-or lack thereof-between these three notions, as well as the foundations of ground, essence, and modality more generally, bringing together work on the metaphysics, epistemology, and logic of these three notions by some of the leading figures in the field as well as emerging young scholars. The invited contributors to this volume presented their work at a conference on Ground, Essence, and Modality at the University of Helsinki in June 2016, funded by the Academy of Finland Project The Epistemology of Metaphysics: From Rationalism to Nominalism. This conference is just one of many recent high-profile events and publications on these themes (e.g., the edited volumes Correia and Schnieder 2012a; Sirkel and Tahko 2014; Jago 2016). After providing a brief historical summary of the (re)emergence of modality, essence and ground as central notions in metaphysics (Sect. 1), we shall outline some of the main themes in recent work on these notions and on the links between them (Sect. 2). In Sect. 3 we briefly introduce the papers in this volume. 1 Historical background The story of modality in the last century is a familiar one. For several decades modal discourse was shunned as suspiciously intensional or lacking empirical bona fides.

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Resurrecting the Hume’s Dictum argument against metaethical non-naturalism

Gordon

2023

Synthese

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I argue for the viability of one neglected way of developing supervenience-based objections to metaethical non-naturalism. This way goes through a principle known as ‘Hume’s Dictum’, according to which there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. I challenge several objections to the Hume’s Dictum-based argument. In the course of doing so, I formulate and motivate modest and precise versions of Hume’s Dictum, illustrate how arguments employing these principles might proceed, and argue that the Hume’s Dictum argument enjoys some advantages relative to other supervenience-based objections to non-naturalism.

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Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism and Normative Supervenience

Abstract: 1Essentially grounded non-naturalism and normative supervenience * Teemu Toppinen forthcoming in Topoi; the final publication is available at Springer via http://dx

Cited by 3 publications

References 13 publications

Non-Naturalism and Reasons-Firstism: How to Solve the Discontinuity Problem by Reducing Two Queerness Worries to One

Non-Naturalism and Reasons-Firstism: How to Solve the Discontinuity Problem by Reducing Two Queerness Worries to One

New frontiers in ground, essence, and modality: introduction

Resurrecting the Hume’s Dictum argument against metaethical non-naturalism

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