Essential Facility Access in Europe: Building a Test for Antitrust Policy

Castaldo, Angelo; Nicita, António

doi:10.2202/1555-5879.1078

Cited by 13 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…However, we argued that this issue deserves further research, in order to investigate-in particular-the role that the secondwave neoliberalism has exerted in shifting the traditional left-wing political platform 'to the right'. Several political scientists (Butler and Savage 1995;Esping-Andersen 1993;Hout et al 1995;Kriesi 1989;Manza and Brooks 1999) recently argued that transformation in the political agenda could be the result of changes in the social structure and hence in political competition. According to these authors, liberalization may have become a post-ideological 'must have' item in political parties' policy toolkits, irrespective of traditional cleavages.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political determinants of liberalization: do ideological cleavages still matter?

Belloc

Nicita

2011

Int Rev Econ

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We investigate the political determinants of liberalization in OECD network industries, performing a panel estimation over 30 years, through the largest and most updated sample available. Our results contrast with the traditional wisdom according to which right-wing governments do promote market-oriented policies more intensively than left-wing ones. Our findings reveal a neglected role of the so-called neoliberalism in promoting left-wing market-oriented policy. As a result, we claim that ideological cleavages ceased to act as determinants of the liberalization wave observed in network industries. This result is confirmed when controlling for the existing regulatory conditions that executives find when elected. Furthermore, we find that the country’s exposure to other countries’ policy initiatives acts as a positive stimulus for liberalization policies

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political determinants of liberalization: do ideological cleavages still matter?

Belloc

Nicita

2011

Int Rev Econ

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“…57 Activating GVG-type remedies may lead to subsidizing inefficient competitors. A competition-law-based logic, putting the emphasis on consumer welfare, may limit such remedies to a "representative" efficient competitor on the market (that has already reached "the minimum efficient scale to enter the relevant market") that cannot finance such assets (Castaldo and Nicita, 2007). which may make it easier for the new entrant to invest in the future in its own facilities.…”

Section: B/ Asymmetric Regulation Is Neededmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which access to which assets for an effective liberalization of the railway sector?

Bougette

Gautier

Marty

2021

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries

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In the European rail industry, to enable competition in the market, entrants should be granted access to a large set of complementary services, beyond access to the tracks. For an efficient and effective entry, temporary access to quasi-essential complementary assets like rolling stock, mechanical maintenance workshops, data, schedules, etc. is required. In the liberalized rail sector, several observed anticompetitive practices involve distorted access to these quasiessential facilities. Therefore, competition agencies must deal with litigation between the incumbent and new entrants. Most cases have been settled, resulting in commitments from the incumbent. We argue that such transitory and case-by-case remedies fail to produce favorable conditions for a secure and efficient entry. Thus, we propose to systematize such remedies through asymmetric and enduring ex-ante regulation.

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“…This is illustrated by the antitrust remedies aimed at granting competitors' access to an essential facility owned by a dominant firm, the regulatory obligation undoubtedly raises new transaction costs, as the incumbent firm is obliged to reintroduce the market inside the firm, and therefore hinder incentives to efficiently invest, both for the new entrants and for the incumbent (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 2001 ;Joskow, 1991Joskow, , 2002Ménard, 2005). This calls for a prudent attitude in applying strong antitrust remedies under NIE's lens (Castaldo and Nicita, 2007). All in all, this calls for a general assessment of the cost and benefits of alternative organizational arrangements, when considering their impact on competition.…”

Section: Managing Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to design institutional frameworks for markets

Brousseau¹,

Nicita²

2010

rei

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The key role of institutions for economic performance has recently been acknowledged in the economic policy debate. This paper aims at pointing out the main policy lessons and the recommendations to be drawn from New Institutional Economics (NIE), when considering the organization of markets. We examine, first, the domains – namely the establishment of property rights, the management of externalities and the maintenance of the competitive process – on which NIE identifies the potential impact of institutional tools on market performance. Second, we highlight the tradeoffs identified in the literature regarding the organization of an institutional system. This leads us to consider the respective virtues and drawbacks of hierarchical vs. transactional, public vs. private, centralized vs. decentralized and formal vs. informal ordering. Finally, we conclude by showing how NIE draws attention to the difficulties faced by political or economic decision-makers when they attempt to enhance market efficiency by reforming institutional frameworks.

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Essential Facility Access in Europe: Building a Test for Antitrust Policy

Cited by 13 publications

References 8 publications

The political determinants of liberalization: do ideological cleavages still matter?

The political determinants of liberalization: do ideological cleavages still matter?

Which access to which assets for an effective liberalization of the railway sector?

How to design institutional frameworks for markets

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