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1989
DOI: 10.2307/2538934
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Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

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Cited by 31 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Lebow and Stein (1994) make a convincing case that the reinforcement of the deterrence logic as lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis may have had destabilising effects for the Cold War more broadly. The problems with the deterrence universal even during the Cuban Missile Crisis became all too obvious after the end of the Cold War when scholars and practitioners alike started to revisit the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allyn et al, 1989;Blight and Welch, 1989;Lebow and Stein, 1994;Scott and Smith, 1994;Allison and Zelikow, 1999;Blight and Lang, 2005;Grattan, 2006), with McNamara (1986 playing an important role in questioning the received wisdom.…”
Section: Studying Political Judgement: a Map For Empirical Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lebow and Stein (1994) make a convincing case that the reinforcement of the deterrence logic as lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis may have had destabilising effects for the Cold War more broadly. The problems with the deterrence universal even during the Cuban Missile Crisis became all too obvious after the end of the Cold War when scholars and practitioners alike started to revisit the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allyn et al, 1989;Blight and Welch, 1989;Lebow and Stein, 1994;Scott and Smith, 1994;Allison and Zelikow, 1999;Blight and Lang, 2005;Grattan, 2006), with McNamara (1986 playing an important role in questioning the received wisdom.…”
Section: Studying Political Judgement: a Map For Empirical Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At a minimum, Soviet officials may have felt that the deployment of a few hundred MR-IRBMs would have the political payoff of blunting the U.S. strategic advantage, possibly permitting Moscow to regain the strategic initiative. 32 As it turned out, the Cuban experience highlighted problems associated with the USSR's inferior strategic position. Because of America's recognized preponderance of strategic power during the crisis, the USSR was at a disadvantage psychologically as well as militarily.…”
Section: Soviet Strategic Prioritiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…31 ACCEPTING THE ANALOGY It is difficult to agree, however, that the 'supposed symmetry between the two deployments was far from obvious' to Kennedy and his advisers. 32 The administration in fact privately acknowledged the Cuba-Turkey analogy, in the broadest sense, in three distinct ways. As the audio transcript for 16 October reveals, two of these variations emerged at the beginning of the crisis deliberations.…”
Section: The Cuba-turkey Analogymentioning
confidence: 99%