Essayism as a form of writing and a form of life

Abstract

As Wittgenstein still eludes classification as either an analytic or a poetic philosopher, this article considers his work under the perspective of essayism as a hybrid intellectual attitude that combines elements from both modes of thinking. Drawing on Adorno’s and Musil’s accounts, I present four characteristics of essayism that can be applied to Wittgenstein’s writing: (a) essayism does not claim access to primal knowledge or an absolute starting point of thought, but typically reacts to given ideas; (b) it is systematic insofar as it is concerned with words, things, and events in systemic contexts rather than in isolation; (c) it is anti‐systematic insofar as it neither accepts the given conceptual system nor strives for an ultimate system in which all things are in their place and all problems ultimately solved; (d) it is aware of, and emphasizes, the mediatedness of its objects and warns of any equation of the conceptual ordering with the order of reality. As a consequence, essayism goes beyond a particular text form, but concerns an attitude towards the world that manifests itself in various forms. It thus turns out to be not merely a form of writing but ultimately a form of life.