Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001

Abstract

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188 The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. REPORT DATE (DD MMYVYY)July 2002 The espionage database we discuss in this report consists of information collected and derived from unclassified sources on the personal and job characteristics of 150 individuals, and on the characteristics of the acts of espionage or attempted espionage they committed. Our analysis begins with the personal characteristics of Americans who spied, including employment and clearance status, how and when the espionage was carried out, and consequences these individuals suffered. In the second section of analysis, we compare cases by the length of their espionage. Subsequent sections compare military offenders with civilians, and volunteers with recruits, and if the individual was recruited, whether by a foreign intelligence service or by family or friends. A fifth section compares motivations for espionage in the various time periods and how motives have changed over time. Additional sections compare lone spies with those who worked with partners or in groups, and characteristics of American female spies.In the Results and Discussion section, we next apply some of our analytical findings on espionage to various aspects of the personnel security system, including the criteria for personnel security that are expressed in the federal Adjudicative Guidelines, patterns in espionage that could be used to improve the security clearance system, and applications to security awareness issues, including co-worker reporting and position vulnerability assessment. The last sections explore trends in the number of Americans actively spying over the last half-century and the recipients of their information, changes in espionage by Americans since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and two key trends that are affecting espionage in the post-Cold War period.These results will be useful to Department of Defense (DoD) policy-makers in framing security countermeasures and security policy. It will also assist DoD component specialists who conduct coimterintelligence and security countermeasures education, training, and securityThis documen...

Proactive Insider Threat Detection through Graph Learning and Psychological Context

“…Sudden changes may be indicative of an imminent insider attack. For example, as noted earlier, many spies underwent a major personal loss before engaging in espionage [39]. Therefore, a sudden change in emotions or other psychological variables is likely to be associated with the start of an attack.…”

“…These models include physical behaviors that are indicators of adversarial intent (e.g. foreign travel, signs of wealth) [19], as well as variables related to motivation, personality, and emotion [20], [21], [22], [23]. While all these models are valuable, none incorporate all of the possible situational triggers, context variables and indicators.…”

Technological, Social, and Economic Trends That Are Increasing U.S. Vulnerability to Insider Espionage

“…Of the many factors known to provide motivation for insider espionage, the experience of personal financial difficulties is among the more prominent. Spies believed to be partially or primarily motivated by a desire to alleviate financial pressures include David Barnett, William Bell, David Boone, Robert Haguewood, Robert Hanssen, Robert Kim, Kurt Lessenthien, Richard Miller, Bruce Ott, Ronald Pelton, Earl Pitts, Brian Regan, and others (Harris, Thompson & Ciccarello, 2002;Herbig & Wiskoff, 2002). Common causes of financial crisis include gambling addiction, substance abuse, loss of job, divorce or separation, unexpected medical expenses, and increasingly-the accumulation of consumer debt (Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, 2000).…”

“…More often, however, disgruntled employees commit crimes against their employers in the form of fraud, embezzlement, and sabotage (Ambrose, Seabright & Schminke, 2002;Morris & Sherman, 1981;Mowday, Porter & Steers, 1982;Peak, 1995;Shaw, Ruby & Post, 1998). Several Americans convicted of espionage against the United States were motivated by desires to exact revenge upon the organizations that employed them (Herbig & Wiskoff, 2002). Disgruntled government insiders who committed espionage include John Charlton, John Allen Davies, Douglas Groat, and Edwin Earl Pitts among others.…”

“…Insiders with such ties are in a better position to transfer U.S. information to foreign contacts and are better equipped to use information obtained through their employment in U.S. firms to participate in joint ventures or to start their own companies abroad (Christie, 2002;Nadel, 2002;Overseas Security Advisory Council, 1992;Saxenian, Motoyama & Quan, 2002). Government insiders whose espionage activities appear to have been influenced by motivation and opportunity stemming from foreign ties, include Joseph Santos, Robert Kim, Douglas Tsou, Charles Anzalone, Thomas Dolce, and Jonathan Pollard (Herbig & Wiskoff, 2002).…”