»Erfahrung und Urteil«

Brudzińska, Jagna

doi:10.1007/978-3-476-05417-3_14

Cited by 4 publications

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“…This interpretation is fitting insofar as Husserl (1939 , p. 21, 1973b , p. 27) calls seeing things as this or that in our everyday lives the “pre-predicative experience.” Brudzińska (2017 , p. 106) explains this term such that it contains no “veiling” idealities, i.e., no concepts. The term “pre-predicative” is undoubtedly apt insofar as I usually see, for instance, a cell phone as a cell phone without forming a predicative judgment.…”

Section: Husserl’s Life-world Ripe With Qualitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 10 Some reject conceiving eidetic variation as akin to Hume’s induction: Lohmar (2005 , pp. 79–80) because he maintains the current variation already includes future ones in the idea of an ‘I can.’ Brudzińska (2017 , p. 112) and Jansen (2017 , p. 145) because its imaginative freedom liberates eidetic variation from induction’s dependency on an empirical and thus factual manifold. I nonetheless maintain that the problem of induction exists as long as one binds intuiting essences to sensory variation.…”

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The shift from quantitative to qualitative thinking—problems and prospects as viewed from Husserl’s and Hegel’s philosophy

Gutland

2023

Front. Psychol.

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This article contrasts the views of the philosophers Husserl and Hegel on quantification in science and compares their proposals for conducting rigorous qualitative research. Both deem quantification integral to science, but furthermore proposed methodologies to investigate qualitative necessities achieved by a shift in conscious activity and awareness. However, their methodologies differ significantly. While Husserl rejects idealization and instead proposes intuitive means to ideate qualitative essential relations, Hegel suggests idealizing less one-sidedly, namely, qualitatively over and above quantitatively. The article first examines how quantification is achieved and how it contrasts with measuring. This contrast reveals that measuring implies knowledge of qualities. These qualities, however, thus far remain oddly external to the mathematical relations linking the various established equations. The article then follows Husserl’s reconstruction of the development of science to illustrate the dismissal of many experiential qualities and how philosophy further amplified skepticism about science on qualities. Husserl’s notion of the life-world and the method of eidetic variation are then introduced as means to counterbalance mathematical proceedings in science. However, this method reveals both eidetic qualitative structures and psychical structures without being able to distinguish between them. It is thus susceptible to idiosyncratic, traditional, and cultural biases. Subsequently, Hegel’s description of the shift in conscious experience that sets qualitative from quantitative thinking apart is introduced. This shift may overcome the biases, but it faces skepticism that calls for further investigation of the experience of different kinds of thinking.

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Section: Husserl’s Life-world Ripe With Qualitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

The shift from quantitative to qualitative thinking—problems and prospects as viewed from Husserl’s and Hegel’s philosophy

Gutland

2023

Front. Psychol.

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“…De hecho, es analizando nexos predicativos que descubrimos la importancia de lo nominal. Que algo sea objetivo en sentido estricto quiere decir que tenemos de él una conciencia nominal o que admite, según su esencia, una nominalización que extrae de él un objeto 12 Husserl realiza una exposición detallada de estas relaciones en: Husserl, E. (1939). Erfahrung und Urteil, Prag, Academia, pp.…”

Section: Intencionalidad Y Gramáticaunclassified

Significado, intencionalidad y gramática en las <i>Lecciones sobre teoría del significado</i> de Husserl

Puricelli

2023

Inv.Fen

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Las Lecciones sobre teoría del significado (1908) constituyen un valioso documento a la hora de estudiar el pensamiento de Edmund Husserl a propósito del lenguaje. Sin embargo, este texto ha sido escasamente considerado por la crítica. En este trabajo, intentaré mostrar que el estudio de los planteos desarrollados en dichas lecciones resulta de gran interés para el análisis de las continuidades y cambios en el pensamiento de Husserl, así como también para la discusión filosófica sobre el lenguaje. Me concentraré en dos temáticas que considero fundamentales y que servirán, a mi entender, para dar cuenta de su espíritu y relevancia: 1) la distinción entre dos conceptos de significado y sus repercusiones en la distinción entre significado y objeto; 2) la relación entre nuestras dinámicas de trato con las cosas y las formas gramaticales en que dicho trato se expresa lingüísticamente.

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“…Ma non sono «scomparsi», restano a nostra disposizione «come deposito di conoscenze abituali», sempre riattivabili e pronti ad essere nuovamente ridestati con «un'associazione attuale». Diventano «possesso nella forma dell'abitudine», «sapere abituale», «conoscenze acquisite» e «risultato durevole» (Husserl 1939, 109 e pp. ).…”

Section: La Percezione è Tempounclassified

“…Siamo di fronte a «uno dei problemi principali della fenomenologia». «Questi difficili problemi costituiscono il grande tema di una più avanzata fenomenologia della coscienza interna del tempo» (Husserl 1939, 141 e pp.). Riappaiono le 'difficoltà' assieme all'obiettivo di una nuova e completa Phӓnomenologie des Zeitbewusstsein, che sembra poter ripartire in maniera suggestiva quasi dal titolo delle Lezioni, una volta incardinato il tempo al centro al centro di passività e percezione e nel cuore della coscienza e del pensiero husserliano.…”

Section: La Forma (Passiva) Del Tuttounclassified

La coscienza è tempo. "Esperienza e giudizio": eredità e sfida dell'ultimo Husserl

Gamba

2023

LLM

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Time and time consciousness have always been for Edmund Husserl a kind of torment, a stimulus, an enigma, an 'ultimate and true absolute', as he wrote in the Ideen. This paper aims to show that Husserl addressed this topic, after the Vorlesungen, especially in his last published book Erfahrung und Urteil, presenting a solution that introduces a possible new perspective on thought. The conceptual core of this solution is found in the complex and fascinating analysis of passive temporal synthesis. Consciousness, temporality and perception become the terms of multiple equations in their fundamental, mobile and unguaranteed basis, in a way that challenges the centuries-old concept of the central unity of the constant ego. In the middle of dark times, aware of his 'discoveries' of the 1930s such as pre-predictivity, Lebenswelt, anonymous and functioning intentionality, and always on behalf of the new rationalism, this also seems to be one of the most important final responses given by Husserl to Heidegger, as well as one of his most fruitful legacies and challenges to further thinking.

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»Erfahrung und Urteil«

Cited by 4 publications

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The shift from quantitative to qualitative thinking—problems and prospects as viewed from Husserl’s and Hegel’s philosophy

The shift from quantitative to qualitative thinking—problems and prospects as viewed from Husserl’s and Hegel’s philosophy

Significado, intencionalidad y gramática en las <i>Lecciones sobre teoría del significado</i> de Husserl

La coscienza è tempo. "Esperienza e giudizio": eredità e sfida dell'ultimo Husserl

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