2022
DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2022.2085096
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Erdoğan and the Muslim Brotherhood: an outside-in approach to Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2022
2022
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 13 publications
(10 citation statements)
references
References 23 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Moreover, Turkey positioned fighter jets and military personnel in Azerbaijan in case of external intervention (Yeni Şafak, 2020). Indeed, it was an extension of revisionist Turkish foreign policy, expanding its influence on the broader Middle East (Ataman & Özdemir, 2018;Taş, 2022). The victory of Azerbaijan consolidated Turkish existence in the South Caucasus as the regional power, both states signed the Shusha Declaration a year after to defend each other in case of an attack on one of the states.…”
Section: Consequences Of the War And Great Power Competition In The R...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, Turkey positioned fighter jets and military personnel in Azerbaijan in case of external intervention (Yeni Şafak, 2020). Indeed, it was an extension of revisionist Turkish foreign policy, expanding its influence on the broader Middle East (Ataman & Özdemir, 2018;Taş, 2022). The victory of Azerbaijan consolidated Turkish existence in the South Caucasus as the regional power, both states signed the Shusha Declaration a year after to defend each other in case of an attack on one of the states.…”
Section: Consequences Of the War And Great Power Competition In The R...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This research examines 10 years of Khamenei's speeches as a case study of a unilateral political communication method in an authoritarian environment. It also analyzes the ways in which Khamenei seeks to both influence policymaking and advance the regime agenda—to maintain regime stability, uphold “strategic autonomy” (Kutlay & Öniş, 2021; Taş, 2022) and claim economic and political strength.…”
Section: Research Agendamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the first 10 years of the post-Cold War period, elements of change and continuity co-existed in the Turkish strategic approach. A breakthrough shift occurred only in 2002 when the AKP won the elections with a clear majority (Bacik, 2004), gaining full government responsibility to an Islamic political party for the first time in the history of the Republic. Much has been said about the specific features of the AKP, its strategic approach, and foreign policy (Karabekir 2021, Kirdiş, 2015).…”
Section: Upgrading Turkish Nationalism: the Akp’s Eramentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Erdoğan and the AKP government strengthened their relations with the Bashar al-Assad regime (Bacık, 2007) before abandoning him. As the Syrian unrest erupted, Erdoğan decided to prioritize the strategic need to be portrayed as the champion of the Arab street and the primary protector of Sunni groups—particularly those closer to the Muslim Brotherhood, whose alliance was a major tool in foreign policy for Türkiye in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (Taş, 2022). This relationship was also crucial in deepening Türkiye–Qatar relations in those years (Başkan, 2016).…”
Section: Upgrading Turkish Nationalism: the Akp’s Eramentioning
confidence: 99%