Eradicating Terrorism in Asymmetric Conflict: The Role and Essence of Military Deterrence

Ünal, Mustafa Coşar; Uludağ, Petra Cafnik

doi:10.1080/09546553.2020.1742113

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…After 1986, the PKK moved to strategic equilibrium, employing increased systematic violence and conducting raids on isolated army bases with convened groups of up to 600 and strived to advance throughout the key region, 8 namely, southeastern and eastern Anatolia, where a Kurdistan was to be established. The aim was "out-fighting" the TAF through physical extermination (Ünal & Cafnik Uludağ, 2020;Ünal, 2016c).…”

Section: Phase I: Confrontation: the Decisive Phase (1984-1993/94)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Its shift to increased asymmetry and terrorist attacks required far fewer fighters with a much lower risk of detection, making the PKK resilient to conducting attacks that hurt security perception. In this context, in 2007, Ankara recognized that eradicating the PKK with sole military means was not viable (Ünal & Cafnik Uludağ, 2019;2020). Thus, it changed its previous political end-state to terminate the PKK conflict using non-violent means, namely, conflict resolution approaches.…”

Section: Revista Científicamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The aim was to remain at the forefront of the government's agenda, seeking a negotiated settlement. In military terms, the insurgent shifted from attrition to moral exhaustion of the TAF and the State itself, targeting Ankara's will to fight by conducting large-scale terrorist attacks in rural and urban areas (Ünal, 2016a;Ünal and Cafnik Uludağ 2019;2020). Overall, after several setbacks, the PKK managed to establish a strategy bridge, adapting to its present situation.…”

Section: Analysis Of Phase IImentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, Ankara's counteroffensive efforts had to be expanded to Northern Syria and Northern Iraq. For instance, Ankara conducted cross-border ops to weaken the PYD, the PKK's Syrian branch, which was almost in control of the Syrian-Turkish border, with the potential of spilling over into Turkey and giving the PKK the ability to regroup and recover and recruit more fighters (Ünal & Cafnik Uludağ 2020).…”

Section: Revista Científicamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Reflecting its resolutions from its 2 nd Conference (1990) and 4 th Congress (1991), the PKK strived to attrit the government in these regions during this phase. 9 The PKK directly challenged and confronted the TAF, striving to drive them out (Ünal & Cafnik Uludağ, 2020). Following the Maoist strategy, the PKK conducted attacks in places where the governmental control was weak, such as remote hamlets, villages, and military outposts.…”

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confidence: 99%

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This article longitudinally analyzes the strategic interaction between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in their four decades of conflict. Using contemporary strategic theory as an analytical framework, it analyzes how the parties’ strategies –grand and military– and political objectives align. It finds that both parties have struggled with establishing (aligning policy, strategy, and resources) and, in several instances, maintaining a functioning strategy bridge. Static approaches that solely worked in a specific context and the absence of a strategy bridge have plagued both actors, thus perpetuating the ongoing conflict. The authors conclude that the conflict will likely continue unless one of the parties can create and maintain a working strategy bridge for an extended period.

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Section: Phase I: Confrontation: the Decisive Phase (1984-1993/94)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Revista Científicamentioning

confidence: 99%