Equivalence in Business Models of Informational Intermediary

Yang, Kai Hao

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3457015

“…Among the aforementioned papers, , Bergemann et al (2018) and Yang (2019) are the closest to my paper. Specifically, explore the welfare implications of different market segmentations, while I introduce a data broker who designs the market segmentation in order to maximize revenue.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 86%

“…Bergemann et al (2018) solve a mechanism design problem in which the designer sells experiments to a decision maker who has private information about his belief. Yang (2019) considers a model where an intermediary can provide information about the product to the consumers and charge the seller for such services. Segura-Rodriguez (2020) studies the revenue maximization of a data broker who sells data to firms that differ in the consumer characteristics they wish to forecast.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Also, this paper allows a large class of priors, including those with infinite support. Finally, Yang (2019) solves for optimal mechanisms of an intermediary that can provide information about the product to the consumers, while in this paper I consider the case where an intermediary sells information about the consumers' values to the producer.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and its Consequences

Yang¹

2020

Self Cite

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A data broker sells market segmentations created by consumer data to a producer with private production cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers with heterogeneous values. In this setting, I completely characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. In particular, every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. That is, the data broker sells the producer a market segmentation described by a cost-dependent cutoff, such that all the consumers with values above the cutoff end up buying and paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization of optimal mechanisms leads to additional economically relevant implications. I show that the induced market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more active in the product market by gaining the ability to contract on prices; or by becoming an exclusive retailer, who purchases both the product and the exclusive right to sell the product from the producer, and then sells to the consumers directly. Moreover, vertical integration between the data broker and the producer increases total surplus while leaving the consumer surplus unchanged, since consumer surplus is zero under any optimal mechanism for the data broker.

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“…The research highlights the benefits of interoperable platforms for the management of companies in various business sectors (industry, trade, research, health, etc.) that can come together to share knowledge, technology and develop successful business models [82,83]. This approach offers new perspectives on how to use the interoperability of the commissioning system and broadens the scope of future research.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Collaborative Approach to Sustainability: A Model of Commissioning System Intervention in Supporting Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships from National to Global Levels

Dragomir

¹

,

Foriş

²

2022

Sustainability

2

0

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The paper addresses the role of intermediaries in optimizing collaborative practices for sustainability and provides new perspectives on how the commissioning system intervenes in supporting multi-stakeholder partnerships that operate on different geographical scales. We present in this study a unitary model for the development of the commissioning system with geographically hierarchical structures, from local and national to regional and global levels, capable of creating a network of interdependent connections with international potential between a wide range of parties engaged in collaboration for sustainable territorial development. The paper highlights the potential of the commissioning system to provide better support for sustainability partnerships and identifies the roles that commissioning structures can play for the benefit of the parties interested in mobilizing and accessing capabilities and resources for development. Through its intervention, the collaborative actions between the parties are streamlined and the management of demands and offers of development resources is optimized. Our findings show that such an intervention adds value to partnerships for sustainability at regional and global levels by dynamizing the collaboration, exchange and transfer of resources between the states, using functional collaboration networks created among multiple interacting stakeholders to support the sustainable development goals implementation.

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“…Bergemann et al (2018) solve a mechanism design problem in which the designer sells experiments to a decision maker who has private information about his belief. Yang (2019) considers a model where an intermediary can provide information about the product to the consumers and charge the seller for such services. Segura-Rodriguez (2020) studies the revenue maximization of a data broker who sells data to firms that differ in the consumer characteristics they wish to forecast.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market Segmentation Design and its Consequences

Yang¹

2020

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

0

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A data broker sells market segmentations created by consumer data to a producer with private production cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers with heterogeneous values. In this setting, I completely characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. In particular, every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. That is, the data broker sells the producer a market segmentation described by a cost-dependent cutoff, such that all the consumers with values above the cutoff end up buying and paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization of optimal mechanisms leads to additional economically relevant implications. I show that the induced market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more active in the product market by gaining the ability to contract on prices; or by becoming an exclusive retailer, who purchases both the product and the exclusive right to sell the product from the producer, and then sells to the consumers directly. Moreover, vertical integration between the data broker and the producer increases total surplus while leaving the consumer surplus unchanged, since consumer surplus is zero under any optimal mechanism for the data broker.

show abstract

Equivalence in Business Models of Informational Intermediary

Cited by 3 publications

References 16 publications

Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and its Consequences

Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and its Consequences

The Collaborative Approach to Sustainability: A Model of Commissioning System Intervention in Supporting Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships from National to Global Levels

Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market Segmentation Design and its Consequences

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