Equilibrium strategies of the unobservable  M / M /1 queue with balking and delayed repairs

Yu, Senlin; Liu, Zaiming; Wu, Jinbiao

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2016.05.049

Cited by 25 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…(2) The average length of time that a transaction goes from entering the blockchain system to leaving the system is defined as the average confirmation time E(W ) of transaction, which can be obtained by using the Little formula [37], [38] in queuing theory, and it is given by…”

Section: Performance Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance Analysis of Blockchain Consensus System With Interference Factors and Sleep Stage

Fan

Yang

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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Blockchain system is affected by many factors with the rapid development of technology. In order to study the blockchain system more realistically, the processes of transaction consensus and transaction storage are simulated in this paper, and factors such as interference factors, impatience phenomena of transactions and fault repairable conditions of the system during the service process are considered. Vacation queueing model with negative customers, impatient customers, repairable fault and two-phase service that customers can select sever in the first service is established. Using the matrixgeometric solution method, the expressions of the average confirmation time of transactions and other performance measures are given. The parameters of the system are obtained based on the statistics of the blockchain transaction data. The influence of each parameter on the performance measures of blockchain system is analyzed by using MATLAB software. The equilibrium reception rate is discussed by constructing the revenue function of the system, and equilibrium numerical results are obtained. INDEX TERMS Blockchain, two-phase service, matrix-geometric solution, hypothetical test, equilibrium optimization.

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Section: Performance Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance Analysis of Blockchain Consensus System With Interference Factors and Sleep Stage

Fan

Yang

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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“…Xu and Xu [15] analyzed the equilibrium strategic behavior of customers in a singleserver queue with partial failures and repairs. Yu et al [16] studied the equilibrium strategies of an unobservable M/M/1 single-server queue with balking and delayed repairs. en, Yu et al [17] investigated the equilibrium strategies in the almost observable and almost unobservable M/M/1 queues with partial breakdowns.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium Joining Strategies of Delay-Sensitive Customers in a Queueing System with Service Quality Feedback

Liu

Jiang

et al. 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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In some queueing systems, customers are frequently asked for giving a service quality feedback for their service at their service completion instants. Based on this phenomenon, in this paper, we model this type of queueing systems as clearing queues with service quality feedback and system maintenance. Once the system receives an unsatisfied (negative) feedback from customers (i.e., a customer is unsatisfied with the service), the system undergoes an adjustment procedure, and at the same time, all the present customers are forced to leave the system. By considering the waiting cost and reward, we discuss the joining behavior of customers and, respectively, derive the corresponding equilibrium joining strategies and social optimal strategies under different levels of information (the observable and the unobservable cases). Finally, some numerical examples are provided to show the effect of several system parameters on the equilibrium and optimal balking strategies.

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“…Similar economic studies have been also implemented in the queueing systems with various working vacations (see e.g., Zhang et al [8], Sun and Li [9], Sun et al [10], Sun et al [11]). Another direction in the economic analysis of queueing systems concerns the study for the M/M/1 queue with an unreliable server (see e.g., Wang and zhang [12], Li et al [13], Yu et al [14], Chen and Zhou [15]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Equilibrium Strategies in Markovian Queues With Negative Customers and Working Breakdowns

Tian

Wang

2019

IEEE Access

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We consider the customers' strategic behavior in Markovian queues with negative customers and working breakdowns. when a negative customer arrives, the customer being served is forced to leave the system. At the same time, the server breaks down and the service rate decreases. Arriving customers decide whether to enter the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure and the information of the system. By using the probability generating functions, we analyze the steady-state distribution and obtain the mean sojourn time of the arriving customers. We investigate the customers' behavior under different information levels of the system and derive equilibrium strategy for the customers in the fully observable, almost observable, almost unobservable and fully unobservable cases. Finally, some numerical results are provided to illustrate the effect of the system parameters on equilibrium strategies of the observable case and customers' sojourn time for unobservable cases.

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Equilibrium strategies of the unobservable M / M /1 queue with balking and delayed repairs

Cited by 25 publications

References 9 publications

Performance Analysis of Blockchain Consensus System With Interference Factors and Sleep Stage

Performance Analysis of Blockchain Consensus System With Interference Factors and Sleep Stage

Equilibrium Joining Strategies of Delay-Sensitive Customers in a Queueing System with Service Quality Feedback

Analysis of Equilibrium Strategies in Markovian Queues With Negative Customers and Working Breakdowns

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