Equilibrium Joining Strategy in a Batch Transfer Queuing System with Gated Policy

Wang, Zhen; Liu, Liwei; Shao, Yuanfu; Chai, Xudong; Chang, Baoxian

doi:10.1007/s11009-018-9687-3

Cited by 14 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…en, Bountali and Economou [21] investigated the batch services model under imperfect information. Wang et al [22] studied the strategic behavior of passengers in the queueing system with batch transfer under threshold policy and obtained the threshold joining strategies of passengers. Afimeimounga et al [23], Chen et al [24], and the references therein are recommended for the interested readers who want to know more about the customer behavior analysis in batch queueing systems.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Customer Behavior Analysis in Ticket Windows at Scenic Spots from Game-Theoretic Perspective

Jiang

Liu

Ammar

2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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In service industries, especially in some ticket windows at scenic spots, affected by congestion, some customers often find excuses or ask the acquaintances in the queue so as to jump the queue and complete their corresponding service as early as possible. In this paper, we model the queueing phenomenon in the ticket windows at scenic spots as a special queue, namely, the so-called “team queue.” Although this phenomenon often happens in daily life, it is less well known to people. In a team queue, an arriving customer first searches the queue from the top to bottom to see if some of his teammates are already in the queue. If yes, he would join the queue and be served with his teammates; otherwise, he would join the queue at the tail. To this end, arising from the customers’ perspective, the strategic behavior of queueing customers in the ticket windows at scenic spots is analyzed. On the basis of considering the waiting cost and reward, the individual strategies and social optimal strategies of queueing customers are derived, regarding the joining or balking dilemma and for the observable and unobservable cases. Finally, to demonstrate how various parameters affect the joining strategies, some numerical examples are provided.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Customer Behavior Analysis in Ticket Windows at Scenic Spots from Game-Theoretic Perspective

Jiang

Liu

Ammar

2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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“…Recently, Bountali and Economou [25] studied the strategic customer behavior in a twostage service system with batch processing. Wang et al [26] studied passengers' joining strategies in a batch transfer queueing system with gated policy under the full observable case. Adan et al [27] considered a polling system with two queues and studied the optimal routing problem of customers under different levels of information.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Behavior of Customers and Optimal Control for Batch Service Polling Systems with Priorities

Jiang

Liu

et al. 2020

Complexity

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During the past few years, batch service systems have attracted considerable attention due to their wide area of applications. In this present paper, we study a special batch service polling system (the so-called Israeli queue) with priorities. Different from the previous papers which focus on the performance analysis, we aim to investigate the strategic behavior of customers and optimal design for the underlying queueing model. By considering two levels of information (observable and unobservable) provided upon customers’ arrival, we, respectively, derive the equilibrium strategies of high-priority and low-priority customers, regarding the joining or balking dilemma. We also present some numerical examples to reveal the impacts of several parameters on the equilibrium strategies, together with some intuitive explanations. Finally, we formulate the revenue function of the service provider and present the Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm to seek the optimal service prices for the high-priority and low-priority customers to maximize the service provider’s revenue under the two levels of information.

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“…This model complemented Kendall's research. Wang et al [7] studied a double-sided batch transfer queuing system with a gated policy, in which a batch of passengers is matched with a passenger-car. Giveen [8] presented a solution and properties of the time-dependent passenger-taxi model, including the conditions for the existence of the limit distribution.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium and Socially optimal of a double-sided queueing system with two-mass point matching time

Wang¹,

Yang²,

Liu³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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We study a passenger-taxi double-ended queue with impatient passengers and two-point matching time in this paper. The system considered in this paper is different from those considered in the existing literature, which fully considers the matching time between passengers and taxis, and the taxi capacity of the system. The objective is to get the equilibrium joining strategy and the socially optimal strategy under two information levels. For the practical consideration of the airport terminal scenario, two different information levels are considered. The theoretical results show that the passenger utility function in the partially observable case is monotonic. For the complex form of social welfare function of the partially observable case, we use a split derivation. The equilibrium strategy and socially optimal strategy of the observable case are threshold-type. Furthermore, some representative numerical scenarios are used to visualize the theoretical results. The numerical scenarios illustrate the influence of parameters on the equilibrium strategy and socially optimal strategy under two information levels. Finally, the optimal social welfare for the two information levels with the same parameters are compared.

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Equilibrium Joining Strategy in a Batch Transfer Queuing System with Gated Policy

Cited by 14 publications

References 17 publications

Customer Behavior Analysis in Ticket Windows at Scenic Spots from Game-Theoretic Perspective

Customer Behavior Analysis in Ticket Windows at Scenic Spots from Game-Theoretic Perspective

Strategic Behavior of Customers and Optimal Control for Batch Service Polling Systems with Priorities

Equilibrium and Socially optimal of a double-sided queueing system with two-mass point matching time

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