Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information

Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Moreno, Diego; Sela, Aner; Shitovitz, Benyamin

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.004

Cited by 33 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…3 Second, we show that, under standard assumptions, any n-player logit contest satisfies the suf-1 See Vojnović (2016) for an introduction to the theory of contests. 2 Einy et al (2015) independently proved existence in a framework similar to ours. In fact, some of the steps in their initial proof (Einy et al 2013) happen to correspond to steps in our proof.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 54%

“…Equilibrium existence in a state-space framework has been studied also by Einy et al (2015). Their main result, derived through an application of Reny's theorem, is complementary to Theorem 1 in that their conditions are consistent with countably infinite information partitions and nonsmooth contest technologies.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, some of the steps in their initial proof (Einy et al 2013) happen to correspond to steps in our proof. However, Einy et al (2015) do not allow for budget constraints. More importantly, they do not offer general conditions for uniqueness.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information

Ewerhart

Quartieri

2019

Econ Theory

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Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of incomplete information admits a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, provided that all players have positive budgets in all states of the world, existence requires only the usual concavity and convexity assumptions. Information structures that satisfy our conditions for uniqueness include independent private valuations, correlated private values, pure common values, and examples of interdependent valuations. The results allow dealing with inactive types, asymmetric equilibria, population uncertainty, and the possibility of resale. It is also shown that any player that is active with positive probability ends up with a positive net rent. Keywords Imperfectly discriminating contests • Private information • Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium • Budget constraints • Rent dissipation JEL Classification C72 • D23 • D72 • D82 This paper was drafted while the second-named author was visiting the University of Zurich in spring 2013. Two anonymous reviewers and a Co-Editor provided extremely valuable comments. For useful discussions, we would like to thank

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 54%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information

Ewerhart

Quartieri

2019

Econ Theory

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“…Schoonbeek and Winkel (2006) pointed out that, in a contest of one-sided incomplete information, individual types may remain inactive. For a large class of probabilistic incomplete-information contests, including those considered in the present paper, Einy et al (2015) established existence of a Bayesian equilibrium, while Ewerhart and Quartieri (under review) proved existence of a unique Bayesian equilibrium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 70%

Voluntary Disclosure in Unfair Contests

Ewerhart¹,

Grrnseis²

2018

SSRN Journal

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This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of ver-i…able information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Considered are unfair contests, i.e., contests in which, subject to activity conditions, one player (the favorite) is interim always more likely to win than the other player (the underdog). A condition is identi…ed that ensures that a given contest is unfair regardless of disclosure decisions. Under this condition, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the contest with pre-play communication. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog will try to moderate the favorite, while the strongest type of the favorite will try to discourage the underdog-so that the contest unravels. We also show that self-disclosure may, with positive probability, provoke unintended reactions, i.e., "dominant"or "de…ant"behavior. Moreover, while individually rational for the marginal type, the unraveling may be strictly Pareto inferior from an ex-ante perspective. Our main conclusion is just the opposite of the corresponding …nding for the deterministic all-pay auction. The proofs employ lattice-theoretic methods and an improved version of Jensen's inequality.

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“…Even though their information assumption differs from the one that emerges from social projection in our dynamic framework, their results are structurally similar to stage 1 of our game. Fey (2008), Ryvkin (2010), Wasser (2013a, b) and Einy et al (2015) study existence of Bayesian equilibrium in the static incomplete information Tullock contest. 7 The results by Einy et al (2015) are closest to our existence results, as they allow players to have private information about the state of nature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Escalation in conflict games: on beliefs and selection

Konrad

Morath

2019

Exp Econ

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We study learning and selection and their implications for possible effort escalation in a simple game of dynamic property rights conflict: a multi-stage contest with random resolve. Accounting for the empirically well-documented heterogeneity of behavioral motives of players in such games turns the interaction into a dynamic game of incomplete information. In contrast to the standard benchmark with complete information, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium features social projection and type-dependent escalation of efforts caused by learning. A corresponding experimental setup provides evidence for type heterogeneity, for belief formation and updating, for self-selection and for escalation of efforts in later stages.

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Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information

Cited by 33 publications

References 19 publications

Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information

Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information

Voluntary Disclosure in Unfair Contests

Escalation in conflict games: on beliefs and selection

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