Equilibrium behavioural strategies in an &lt;i&gt;M&lt;/i&gt;/&lt;i&gt;M&lt;/i&gt;/1 queue

Ziani, Sofiane; Rahmoune, Fazia; Radjef, Mohammed Saïd

doi:10.1504/ijmor.2018.094853

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The analysis of the strategic behaviors of a server manager and customers has been widely studied in the literature with different modeling approaches. Approaches using game theory tools can be divided into two main families: noncooperative games in a strategic form (also known as a normal form) (see [9,10,17,21,22,28,32],...) and non-cooperative games in a dynamic form (see [5,19,25,27,35],...). Most of the works can be integrated into the class of non-cooperative games in strategic form, even if the game models are not always formulated in explicit form.…”

Section: The Social Welfarementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most of the works can be integrated into the class of non-cooperative games in strategic form, even if the game models are not always formulated in explicit form. However, in recent years, a number of studies has been carried out to model the strategic interactions of decision makers in queueing systems, which use dynamic game tools (see [5,6,14,19,27,34,35],...).…”

Section: The Social Welfarementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The service pricing strategies and the strategic behavior of customers in an unobservable Markovian queue with unreliable server

2022

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A Stackelberg game is used to study the service pricing and the strategic behavior of customers in an unreliable and totally unobservable M/M/1 queue under a reward-cost structure. At the first stage, the server manager, acting as a leader, chooses a service price and, at the second stage, a customer, arriving at the system and acting as a follower, chooses to join the system or an outside opportunity, knowing only the service price imposed by the server manager and the system parameters. We show that the constructed game admits an equilibrium and we give explicit forms of server manager and customers equilibrium behavioral strategies. The results of the proposed model show that the assumption that customers are risk-neutral is fundamental for the standard approach usually used. Moreover, we determine the socially optimal price that maximizes the social welfare and we compare it to the Stackelberg equilibrium. We illustrate, by numerical examples, the effect of some system parameters on the equilibrium service price and the revenue of the server manager.

show abstract