Equality ratio equity, general linear equity and framing effects in judgments of allocation divisions

Abstract

It is argued here that there is not necessarily a contradiction between the general linear and equal ratio approaches to equity, and the two may be integrated to make more precise predictions. It was hypothesized that, (a) equity is best represented by a limited equal ratio rule; (b) the more a linear distribution systematically deviates from equal inputloutcome ratios, the more unfair it will be judged, but (c) subjects will prefer a distribution that accords with a general linear formula in certain cases where an equal ratio distribution of available outcomes would actually infringe a preeminent or established equal ratio distribution.Four studies are presented, the results of which seem broadly to support these ideas. However, the results also suggest that equity judgments can be strongly influenced by framing effects.

A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice

“…Aristotle observed that "what is just … is what is proportional." Baumard et al highlight some experimental evidence that supports Aristotle's insight, but much more is to be found in what psychologists call "modern equity theory" (Adams 1963;Adams & Freedman 1976;Austin & Hatfield 1980;Austin & Walster 1974;Baron 1993;Cohen & Greenberg 1982;Furby 1986;Homans 1961;Mellers 1982;Mellers & Baron 1993;Messick & Cook 1983;Pritchard 1969;Wagstaff 1994;Wagstaff & Perfect 1992;Wagstaff et al 1996;Walster & Walster 1975;Walster et al 1973;.…”

Modeling justice as a natural phenomenon

“…Aristotle observed that “what is just … is what is proportional.” Baumard et al highlight some experimental evidence that supports Aristotle's insight, but much more is to be found in what psychologists call “modern equity theory” (Adams 1963; 1965; Adams & Freedman 1976; Austin & Hatfield 1980; Austin & Walster 1974; Baron 1993; Cohen & Greenberg 1982; Furby 1986; Homans 1961; Mellers 1982; Mellers & Baron 1993; Messick & Cook 1983; Pritchard 1969; Wagstaff 1994; 2001; Wagstaff & Perfect 1992; Wagstaff et al 1996; Walster & Walster 1975; Walster et al 1973; 1978).…”

Equity, justice, and altruism

“…In a number of empirical studies, we have demonstrated that, unless choice or responsibility are clearly absent or unequal, or differential need is made very salient, or the outcomes are incommensurate with the inputs, then the preferred allocation (followed by the overwhelming majority of participants) is to follow the perfect equity, equal proportionality rule with the available outcomes; that is, award rewards (and punishments) in equal proportion to inputs (positive or negative), and give a zero input worker zero outcomes. When a person does nothing, he or she receives nothing (see, for example, Wagstaff, 1994;Wagstaff and Perfect, 1992;Wagstaff and Worthington, in press;Wagstaff, Chadwick, and Brunas-Wagstaff, 1996;Wagstaff, Huggins and Perfect, 1996;Wagstaff et al, 1994). However, Wagstaff and Worthington (in press) have also shown that allocation to a zero input worker "in need" (that is, a person who does nothing at work, but requires money for basic food and shelter) is very much dependent on the context.…”