Epistemology versus non-causal realism

Warren, Jared

doi:10.1007/s11229-015-1010-z

Cited by 15 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…It faces a significant hurdle, which may be called the problem of lucky reliability . A formulation of this problem is offered by Jared Warren (2016; 2017). In his arguments, Warren targets a general form of realism , which he defines as endorsing the following claims: first, that a certain domain of inquiry is one whose discourse is truth apt, where there are some truths to be discovered; second, these truths are mind independent; third, truth is not pluralistic, in the sense that, in each relevant domain, there are not many truths, only one truth; and fourth, the unique truths in each relevant domain are causally inaccessible (2017, 9–10).…”

Section: The Reliability Challenge To the Naturalistic Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ontological disagreements, reliability, and standoffs: The pluralist option

Belleri

2021

Metaphilosophy

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The reliability challenge to ontology can be summarized as the complaint that no satisfying explanation is available of how one can have true ontological beliefs, given that the relevant belief‐forming methods are noncausal (for example, not perception based or memory based). This paper first presents a version of the reliability challenge against realist approaches to ontology, put forward by Jared Warren. It then explores a response to the challenge on behalf of the realist that appeals to the use of abduction. This response does not satisfactorily deal with the reliability challenge, though, and even leads to a further epistemic impasse. At this point, a version of ontological pluralism is presented, according to which all the competing theories in a certain ontological dispute can be true—in a sense of “true” to be articulated. The final step shows how this version of pluralism deals with the reliability challenge, especially with the complaint that we lack an explanation for our true ontological beliefs.

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Section: The Reliability Challenge To the Naturalistic Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ontological disagreements, reliability, and standoffs: The pluralist option

Belleri

2021

Metaphilosophy

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“…70 Especially if our cognitive mechanisms are only causally responsive to our surroundings, see Warren (2017). 71 For more detailed arguments of this kind see Rayo (2015), Warren (2017), and Maurin (2019). Miller and Norton (2017) also touch on some of these concerns.…”

Section: Some Metaphysical Explanations Are Not Conceptualmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists

Locke¹

2020

Metaphysics

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I expand modal normativism, a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of metaphysical explanation. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users to express semantic rules that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary. However, a worry for modal normativism is that it doesn't keep up with all of the important and interesting metaphysics we can do by giving and evaluating metaphysical explanations. So, I advance modal normativism by arguing that metaphysical explanations also have a normative rather than descriptive function. In particular, non-causal explanatory claims have formal and semantic properties that make them expressively stricter than basic modal claims and so are better suited to express fine-grained aspects of semantic rules. A major payoff of my normativist account of metaphysical explanations is that it yields a plausible story about how we come to evaluate and know metaphysical explanations-we do this primarily by conceptual analysis. I also respond to a number of objections, including the objection that the epistemic payoffs of my view are not worth the metaphysical costs.

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“…I discussed some skeptical arguments about intuitions regarding the passage of time, the composition of objects, the self, and consciousness in reply to the previous objection. Skeptical arguments about intuitions regarding non-causal realism have been defended by Benacerraf (1973), Field (1989), Street (2006), Warren (2017). I have defended such skepticism as well in [Anonymized].…”

Section: Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Are the Odds That Everyone Is Depraved?

Hill¹

2020

American Philosophical Quarterly

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Why does God allow evil? One hypothesis is that God desires the existence and activity of free creatures but He was unable to create a world with such creatures and such activity without also allowing evil. If Molinism is true, what probability should be assigned to this hypothesis? Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because there are an infinite number of possible people and because we have no reason to suppose that such creatures will choose one way rather than another. Arguments like this depend on the principle of indifference. But that principle is rejected by most philosophers of probability. Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because doing otherwise violates intuitions about freewill. But such arguments can be addressed through strategies commonly employed to defend theories with counterintuitive results across ethics and metaphysics. Suppose Molinism is true. Then what are the odds that no matter who God created or what circumstances He put them in, they would do evil? According to a common claim, the odds are very small. I argue that a lesson from the fine-tuning literature casts doubt on this claim. I then reply to a series of objections. The objections may be addressed by combining further applications of the lesson with assumptions available to the Molinist about probability, freewill, observational bias, error theory, explanation, and paraphrase. This is relevant to theodicy. If God were unable to create a world with free creatures but no evil, it would form part of the explanation of why God allows evil. 2. The Lesson The universe appears to be fine-tuned for life. Take, for example, the gravitational constant. Our best physics tells us that the APQ 57_3 text.indd 299 4/16/20 1:45 PM

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Epistemology versus non-causal realism

Cited by 15 publications

References 31 publications

Ontological disagreements, reliability, and standoffs: The pluralist option

Ontological disagreements, reliability, and standoffs: The pluralist option

Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists

What Are the Odds That Everyone Is Depraved?

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