Epistemic Pluralism, Epistemic Relativism and ‘Hinge’ Epistemology

Carter, J. Adam

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_9

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…A number of long‐standing and/or contemporary Indigenous frameworks, although scarcely represented in the academic literature (and where they are, it is largely at the hand of Indigenous scholars and/or in Indigenous‐focused journals), may answer directly to this need. They offer means to conceptualize and operationalize the cross‐fertilization and coming together of distinct knowledge systems—epistemic pluralism (Carter, 2017) through an Indigenous lens. Conceptual frameworks are reflective of the knowledge one privileges (Kovach, 2010), and their visualization can guide important research choices (Latulippe, 2015).…”

Section: Models Of Knowledge Coexistencementioning

confidence: 99%

“Two‐Eyed Seeing”: An Indigenous framework to transform fisheries research and management

et al. 2020

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Increasingly, fisheries researchers and managers seek or are compelled to “bridge” Indigenous knowledge systems with Western scientific approaches to understanding and governing fisheries. Here, we move beyond the all‐too‐common narrative about integrating or incorporating (too often used as euphemisms for assimilating) other knowledge systems into Western science, instead of building an ethic of knowledge coexistence and complementarity in knowledge generation using Two‐Eyed Seeing as a guiding framework. Two‐Eyed Seeing (Etuaptmumk in Mi’kmaw) embraces “learning to see from one eye with the strengths of Indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing, and from the other eye with the strengths of mainstream knowledges and ways of knowing, and to use both these eyes together, for the benefit of all,” as envisaged by Elder Dr. Albert Marshall. In this paper, we examine the notion of knowledge dichotomies and imperatives for knowledge coexistence and draw parallels between Two‐Eyed Seeing and other analogous Indigenous frameworks from around the world. It is set apart from other Indigenous frameworks in its explicit action imperative—central to Two‐Eyed Seeing is the notion that knowledge transforms the holder and that the holder bears a responsibility to act on that knowledge. We explore its operationalization through three Canadian aquatic and fisheries case‐studies that co‐develop questions, document and mobilize knowledge, and co‐produce insights and decisions. We argue that Two‐Eyed Seeing provides a pathway to a plural coexistence, where time‐tested Indigenous knowledge systems can be paired with, not subsumed by, Western scientific insights for an equitable and sustainable future.

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Section: Models Of Knowledge Coexistencementioning

confidence: 99%

“Two‐Eyed Seeing”: An Indigenous framework to transform fisheries research and management

et al. 2020

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“…At the same time, the strictly construed independence from national and international law raises many questions; similar to those with which the pluralism literature is grappling: Is it possible to conceive of the jurisdictions in Europe (national, international, EU) as fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems, without accepting 'facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of the others'? 68 Can the other legal systems then be more than facts (lacking the normativity of law)? Does constitutionalism require monism?…”

Section: Autonomy As a Precondition For The Court's Dualist Positionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The autonomy of the EU legal order

Eckes¹

2020

Europe and the World: A Law Review

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The European Union (EU) cannot make a plausible claim to sovereignty under international law. However, what the EU can do and what it also does is, is to act as if it were sovereign and claim certain rights that are considered core elements of state sovereignty. This article argues that the Court of Justice’s (ECJ) conception of the EU legal order as autonomous provides the EU with a core element of state sovereignty: jurisdictional sovereignty. Autonomy construed by the ECJ is best understood in conceptual legal and absolute terms. It is meant to shield the ECJ’s conceptual legal claims from interference. Legal autonomy as construed by the ECJ is not relative as many authors have claimed. It cannot come about in an incremental or relative manner. It cannot be based on arguments relating to the status of a self-contained regime of international law that gradually distances itself from the general rules of international law. It is a conceptual claim giving birth to the assumption of apriority that can only be made in categorical terms. In this way it is similar to sovereignty. The article first sets out how the autonomy of the EU legal order is best understood. It examines the ECJ’s case law in light of legal theoretical considerations and relates it to the separation thesis of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. It then explains that autonomy is of such relevance to the EU legal order because the aprioristic character of EU law remains essentially contested. This relevance indirectly explains why the Court so cautiously protects the autonomy of the EU legal order. Finally, the article examines the Court’s reasoning in Opinion 1/17 in light of the identified absolute conception of autonomy.

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“…This is not the case for the ER literature. Several articles consider plurality or pluralism a component of ER (Boghossian 2007;Kusch 2016;Carter 2017). The idea, however, that SP does not entail ER because ER renounces judgment has not directly been addressed in the ER literature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The choice of the respective desideratum (or desiderata) might be different for each context(Alston 1993, p. 534). Similarities and differences of ER and EP have been addressed inKusch (2017a, b) andCarter (2017).3 In certain versions of this definition, "plurality" is exchanged for "pluralism"(Kusch 2017a, b). In these cases, the qualification: "there are, were or might be several of such ES or bundles," is maintained to describe "pluralism."…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Notes on a complicated relationship: scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances

Veigl

2020

Synthese

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While scientific pluralism enjoys widespread popularity within the philosophy of science, a related position, epistemic relativism, does not have much traction. Defenders of scientific pluralism, however, dread the question of whether scientific pluralism entails epistemic relativism. It is often argued that if a scientific pluralist accepts epistemic relativism, she will be unable to pass judgment because she believes that “anything goes”. In this article, I will show this concern to be unnecessary. I will also argue that common strategies to differentiate relativism and pluralism fail. Building upon this analysis, I will propose a new way of looking at both positions’ relations. This article aims to understand what explains the friction between scientific pluralism and epistemic relativism. I will demonstrate that conceptualizing both epistemic relativism and scientific pluralism as “stances” sheds better light on their relation and demonstrates that it is, in principle, possible to support both positions at the same time. Preferred policies and levels of analysis, however, cause friction in practice.

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Epistemic Pluralism, Epistemic Relativism and ‘Hinge’ Epistemology

Cited by 15 publications

References 12 publications

“Two‐Eyed Seeing”: An Indigenous framework to transform fisheries research and management

“Two‐Eyed Seeing”: An Indigenous framework to transform fisheries research and management

The autonomy of the EU legal order

Notes on a complicated relationship: scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances

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