Epistemic Normativity: From Direct to Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism

Vahid, Hamid; Grajner, Martin; Schmechtig, Pedro

doi:10.1515/9783110496765-012

Cited by 16 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We can run versions of this case in which the agent is assured that p will be output by the process ahead of their decision to adopt B, and others where they are unaware. In neither version would the fairy's offer redeem believing p in such a way.13 This is notGoldman (1979)'s process reliabilism (seeGoldman, 2015, (a reply to Berker) and discussion inBerker, 2015 andVahid, 2016). Process reliabilism doesn't make conduciveness sufficient for justification.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic deontology, epistemic trade-offs, and Kant’s formula of humanity

Andow

2023

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic deontology, epistemic trade-offs, and Kant’s formula of humanity

Andow

2023

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There are lots of examples in the relevant literature that can bring out this point. See, for example, Vahid ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification

Vahid

2017

Theoria

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Crispin Wright has advanced a number of arguments to show that, in addition to evidential warrant, we have a species of non-evidential warrant, namely, "entitlement", which forms the basis of a particular view of the architecture of perceptual justification known as "epistemic conservatism". It is widely known, however, that Wright's conservative view is beset by a number of problems. In this article, I shall argue that the kind of warrant that emerges from Wright's account is not the standard truth-conducive justification, but what is known as the deontological conception of justification. It will be argued that the deontological justification has features that make it a better candidate for representing a conservative architecture. These results will be reinforced by showing how the deontological framework can make better sense of a recent theory of justified (reasonable) belief that takes its inspiration from Wright's conservative account. Thus understood, we may see the liberalism-conservatism controversy as actually an extension of the older debate over which conception of justification, truth-conducive or deontological, can best represent the epistemic status of our belief-forming practices.1 There is a huge debate in the philosophy of perception (e.g., Siegel, 2010) about whether perceptual experiences can represent "high-level" properties such as kinds (of objects) or merely "low-level" properties such as colour, shape, etc. For the sake of discussion, I am assuming the former, rich content, view. But my arguments can equally go through if the latter view is adopted.

show abstract

Morality and Epistemic Judgement

Cowie¹

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist. As a consequence those judgments – and those of us who make them – are systematically mistaken. This is the moral error theory. One of the most interesting and important reasons for rejecting it is that its truth would entail a highly implausible error theory of epistemic judgments. These are judgments about what one ought to believe given one’s evidence. This is the argument from analogy. The aim of this book is to systematise and assess it. It is argued that it fails. The analogy between moral judgment and epistemic judgment is misconceived. The moral error theory could yet be true.

show abstract

Epistemic Normativity: From Direct to Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

Epistemic deontology, epistemic trade-offs, and Kant’s formula of humanity

Epistemic deontology, epistemic trade-offs, and Kant’s formula of humanity

Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification

Morality and Epistemic Judgement

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About