Epistemic Justification

Abstract

Modern disputes about what makes a belief epistemically justified or rational are flawed through failing to recognize that there are different kinds of justifications that are in different ways indicative that the belief is true. I distinguish synchronic justification (the belief being a justified response to the believer's situation at the time) from diachronic justification (the belief constituting a justified response to adequate investigation over time); and, for each of these kinds, internalist justification (justification by introspectible factors) from externalist justification (justification by factors not necessarily accessible to the believer). A belief is internally synchronically justified if it is rendered inductively probable by the believer's basic beliefs; but ‘inductively probable’ may mean probable by true a priori standards (logically probable), by true standards to the best of the believer's ability to discover this (epistemically probable), or simply by the believer's own standards (subjectively probable). External synchronic justification is normally a matter of being produced by a reliable process, and there are many different ways of spelling that out. A belief is diachronically justified to the extent to which it results from adequate investigation. This depends (positively) on how probable it was that investigation would lead to evidence that would make a difference to the original probability of the belief; how probable it was that the issue was important; and (negatively) on how probable it was that investigation would cost much time and money. But all these ‘probabilities’ can be spelled out in different internalist and externalist ways. Almost all these kinds of justification are worth having, because it is logically probable that a belief justified in almost all these ways will be true. This account of justification is extended to give an account of different kinds of knowledge, all of which are worth having.

Phenomenal Conservatism and the Demand for Metajustification

“…As I have argued elsewhere, however, being epistemically blameless (or satisfying other similar deontological requirements) is not enough for genuine epistemic justification: the aim of epistemic 24 In fact, this may not be really true. As Richard Swinburne (2001) has defended, there is a kind of "diachronic" justification that is extremely important. That means that the subject S has to engage herself in serious investigation concerning P in order to be (diachronically) justified in believing that P. So, thinking in deontological terms, S may follow her appearances but be "blameworthy" for not fulfilling her "duty" of engaging in serious investigation.…”

Gregory Palamas and our Knowledge of God

“…He resisted their suggestion that as they believe in his prophet, he ought to believe in theirs -on the ground that the Old Testament Scriptures which they also revered did not prophecy the advent of Mohammad, and that Mohammad's teaching, unlike that of Moses and Jesus, was not accompanied by miracles. 16 So, he was in effect appealing to Scotus's first and eighth criteria; and he clearly did think that there are publicly available reasons in defence of at least some aspects of Christian doctrine.…”

Are We Sending Mixed Messages? How Philosophical Naturalism Erodes Ethical Instruction

“…Additionally, Plantinga (1993a, b), for example, elaborates on the notion of warrant to justify knowledge claims, and Swinburne (2001) further adds the criterion of an adequate investigation of the evidence over time. By applying well-documented epistemic criteria to ethical reasoning, it is possible to achieve a reasonable level of certainty with respect to ethical knowledge.…”