Epistemic Injusticefrom Afar: Rethinking the Denial of Armenian Genocide

Abstract

Genocide denialism is an understudied topic in the epistemic injustice scholarship; so are epistemic relations outside of the Euro-American context. This article proposes to bring the literature into contact with an underexplored topic in a 'distant' setting: Turkey. Here, I explore the ethical and epistemological implications of the Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide as a pervasive and systematic epistemic harm. Using an interdisciplinary methodology, I argue that a philosophical exploration of genocide denialism requires examining the role of institutions and ideology in relation to the epistemic harm done by individual perpetrators. More specifically, I suggest that the individual, ideological, and institutional roots of genocide denialism constitute a regime of epistemic injustice in Turkey.

Archives, Epistemic Injustice and Knowing the Past

“…Troublesome similarities between the cases discussed in previous sections and those elaborated upon by Altanian (2020) and Oranlı (2020) arise. In Altanian's (2020) definition of genocide denialism we find the maintaining of entrenched prejudices against former victim groups and distorting historical facts, both of which are topics that have been touched upon previously in this article.…”

“…This brings us to the second of the two recent developments in the literature on epistemic injustice that this essay engages with, namely the theorisation of denial of past wrongdoing as epistemic injustice. I take this development to primarily consist of three articles published in the second half of 2020, two papers by Altanian (2020) and Oranlı (2020) on the denial of the Armenian genocide and the paper by Song (2020) on Japan's denial of military sexual slavery. The cases discussed by Altanian (2020), Oranli (2020) and Song (2020) carry many similarities to the situation discussed in this section.…”

“…In an earlier paper, Oranli (2018) demonstrated that the denial of the Armenian genocide involves several forms of epistemic injustice such as testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice and the unjust distribution of epistemic resources. In a more recent paper, Oranlı (2020) draws on the work of Fricker (2007), Medina (2013) and Mills (2017) to demonstrate the interrelatedness of individuals who perpetrate genocide denialism, the ideology behind denialism and the institutions supporting genocide denialism. Oranlı (2020) suggests that to fully understand such an epistemically unjust regime one must trace both the individual, the institutional and the ideological.…”

“…In a more recent paper, Oranlı (2020) draws on the work of Fricker (2007), Medina (2013) and Mills (2017) to demonstrate the interrelatedness of individuals who perpetrate genocide denialism, the ideology behind denialism and the institutions supporting genocide denialism. Oranlı (2020) suggests that to fully understand such an epistemically unjust regime one must trace both the individual, the institutional and the ideological. She concludes her argument by arguing that the responsibility for genocide recognition thus belongs not only to governments, but also to individuals themselves, as if they do not actively resist, they become actively ignorant deniers themselves.…”

“…By examining the historical case of Kenya's 'migrated archives', I demonstrate that actions in the past can cause long-lasting epistemic harms and constitute complex and significant ethical challenges. The essay is situated in relation to two recent developments in the literature on epistemic injustice: the theorising of denial of past wrongdoing as a form of epistemic injustice (Altanian 2020;Oranlı 2020;Song 2020) and the interest in epistemic injustice and archives (Melanson 2020;Wouters 2020). The discussion primarily pertains to archives as a terrain for epistemic harms and injustice, and the issues that arise when archives are censored, hidden, or outright destroyed in efforts to sanitise collective memory.…”