Epistemic Functions of Replicability in Experimental Sciences: Defending the Orthodox View

Abstract

Replicability is widely regarded as one of the defining features of science and its pursuit is one of the main postulates of meta-research, a discipline emerging in response to the replicability crisis. At the same time, replicability is typically treated with caution by philosophers of science. In this paper, we reassess the value of replicability from an epistemic perspective. We defend the orthodox view, according to which replications are always epistemically useful, against the more prudent view that claims that it is useful in very limited circumstances. Additionally, we argue that we can learn more about the original experiment and the limits of the discovered effect from replications at different levels. We hold that replicability is a crucial feature of experimental results and scientists should continue to strive to secure it.

Values, bias and replicability

“…Moreover, such a systematic bias may be challenging to detect due to its universality. Replication plays a crucial role in scientific self-correction (see e.g., Sikorski & Andreoletti, 2023) and failed replications can help uncover biasing assumptions. If the problematic assumption is widespread among scientists, the chances of it being detected through replication are slim.…”

Growth From Uncertainty: Understanding the Replication ‘Crisis’ in Infant Cognition

“…The problems arise when researchers fail to acknowledge their work for what it is: a process of building outward from an uncertain foundation. An important lesson being learned from the replication crisis is that this starting point needs to be made more explicit (Bringmann et al 2022;Feest 2022;Sikorski and Andreoletti 2023).…”