Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle

Abstract

that an act is morally justified only if there are factors indicating that performing the act itself is pleasurable). In a first step I will argue that this difference rests on the fact that plausible versions of epistemic consequentialism have to meet certain constraints, which versions of ethical consequentilialism do not have to satisfy. As these constraints can be easily met by incorporating the truth-indication principle, epistemic consequentialists tend to subscribe to it.In a second step I will investigate whether the identified constraints can also be met independently of the truth-indication principle. Are there plausible versions of veritistic epistemic consequentialism that reject the principle, thereby allowing that some beliefs can be epistemically justified even though no factors speak in favor of their truth? Building on ideas put forward by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Crispin Wright, and others, I will answer this question affirmatively.2

A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification

“…For using deontology broadly and teleology narrowly instead, see Kagan (1998) and Klausen (2009). 6 For example, Feldman (1988) and Briesen (2016). 7 But see Berker (2013) and Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn (2018).…”

“…For the relevance truth goal, seeHaack (1993, 199),Harman (1986),Briesen (2016), andKhalifa (2020). For famous counter-cases, seeGrimm (2008, 742).22 SeeDavid ([2005] 2014, 365-56).…”

Epistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies

“…Those who have explored and discussed consequentialist approaches in epistemology have typically framed things solely in terms of the epistemic status of beliefs or the acceptance of propositions (see, e.g., Briesen 2016 ; Percival 2002 ). Epistemic consequentialism has been characterized as the view that ‘epistemic features such as warrant accrue to a belief (or acceptance) of S’s in virtue of the (expected) epistemic consequences of S’s being in that state’ (Elstein and Jenkins 2017 ) or the view that ‘the epistemic status of an attitude is determined by the epistemic value of its consequences compared to the epistemic value of the consequences of the alternatives’ (Jenkins 2007 ).…”