Epiphenomenal Qualia

Jackson, Frank

doi:10.4324/9780203826430-10

Cited by 250 publications

(327 citation statements)

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“…I will do this using the most compelling and influential argument that physical theory will fail to account for phenomenal experience: Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, which aims to show that there is something about phenomenal experience that cannot be captured as physical information (Jackson, 1982). The influence of this argument has not abated, even though Jackson now doubts its conclusion.…”

Section: Phenomenal Experience and The Measure Of Informationmentioning

confidence: 97%

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Phenomenal experience and the measure of information

DeLancey

2007

Erkenntnis

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Section: Phenomenal Experience and The Measure Of Informationmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…The first explicit formulation, 1 and the most intuitively compelling form, of the Knowledge Argument was given by Frank Jackson (Jackson, 1982). Jackson illustrates the argument with a thought experiment:…”

Section: How Much Does Mary Know?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal experience and the measure of information

DeLancey

2007

Erkenntnis

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“…Ontological irreducibility, however, needs an argument. Searle adopts it from the works of Kripke (1972, 1980), Nagel (1974 and Jackson (1982): suppose that John is in a conscious mental state such as pain. There are two facts in virtue of which the statement ''John is in pain'' is true.…”

Section: Ontological Irreducibility Of Minds-a Terminological Confusion?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Searle on the unity of the world

Novotný

2007

Axiomathes

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According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true-''the world is one''. The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle's defence of the ontological irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility is unsuccessful. Third, I defend Nagel's argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle's objections to it.

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“…A perfect neuroscientific understanding of the bat's brain function does not help much in guessing the quality of its senses (Nagel 1974). An expert physicalist knowledgeable about all the details of colors, living from the beginning of his existence inside a colorless environment, would not be able to imagine what a yellow banana would look like (Jackson 1982).…”

Section: Consciousness and Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

A critical review of the physicalistic approaches of the mind and consciousness

Livaditis

Tsatalmpasidou

2007

Cogn Process

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The aim of this paper is to construct a critical evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of the physicalistic theory concerning mental phenomena and consciousness. Physicalism can, better than other theories, explain mental phenomena, such as intentionality and reasonability of human beings and other biological organisms. Modern neuroscience corroborates the conviction that the brain is a physical mind capable of giving meaning to, evaluating and further cognitively and behaviorally transforming complex aspects of the world. On the other hand, the emergence of consciousness from brain states seems to be a paradoxical, intransparent, physical coincidence hardly explained by the mental function of the brain at the physical level. Moreover, the intentionality and reasonability of psychic phenomena per se cannot be explained as a repercussion of the same attributes characterizing the brain function. In conclusion, the old debate between physicalism and other philosophical theories remains open. It can be expected that the progress of sciences will inspire novel approaches to the problem of the relations between matter, mind and consciousness.

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Epiphenomenal Qualia

Cited by 250 publications

References 0 publications

Phenomenal experience and the measure of information

Phenomenal experience and the measure of information

Searle on the unity of the world

A critical review of the physicalistic approaches of the mind and consciousness

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