Epidemiology of Failed Tobacco Control Legislation

Abstract

Tobacco industry contributions to members of the US Congress strongly influence the federal tobacco policy process. Unless this influence is diminished through a combination of members refusing tobacco money and campaign finance reform, this process of contributing to death by thwarting tobacco control will continue to claim hundreds of thousands of lives a year.

Cancer beliefs and prevention policies: comparing Canadian decision-maker and general population views

“…The implications of emphasizing individual behavior over the structural factors that influence it have been criticized as ''victim-blaming'' [63]. Previous research examining policy support in relation to political partisanship has found that right-leaning political conservatives are usually less supportive of tobacco control and obesity-targeted policies than left-leaning progressive parties [64][65][66][67]. Taking political views and party preferences into account (Alberta is a long-standing conservative province, politically), it is not surprising that the strongestsupported policies were related to individual-based public education campaigns for cancer prevention rather than to control-based approaches, such as fiscal measures, regulation, or legislative action.…”

The Political Dynamics of Tobacco Control in Australia and New Zealand: Explaining Policy Problems, Instruments, and Patterns of Adoption

“…Several possible explanations have been offered for the development of domestic tobacco-control policy, including political institutions, especially decentralisation (Studlar 2003a;Marmor and Lieberman 2004), political culture/public opinion (Wilensky 2002;Ballard 2004;Troyer and Markle 1983), agenda setting (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), interest groups/social movements (Nathanson 1999;Read 1996), political ideology, parties, and elections (Moore et al 1994), policy type (Studlar 2003a), bureaucratic strength (Fritschler and Hoefler 1996;Deeks 1992), and international networks/lesson drawing/policy transfer (Studlar 2002;Farquharson 2003;Ballard 2004). Studlar (2002) surveys most of these in a comparative study of tobacco-control policy in Canada and the United States.…”

The new battleground: California's experience with smoke-free bars

“…Legislators voting yes on SB 137 (pro-tobacco) received a total of $433700 in tobacco industry campaign contributions in the period 1997 to 1998 (mean, $9857 per vote) 9 ; those voting no on SB 137 (pro-health) received $1000 in tobacco industry campaign contributions in the period 1997 to 1998 (mean, $36 per vote) (P < .001 by Mann-Whitney test). Previous research in California, 9,17,18 other states, 15 and the US Congress 19 has shown that tobacco industry campaign contributions both influence legislators' voting patterns on tobacco issues and serve as a reward for voting favorably for the tobacco industry.…”

“…As a result, the industry may be shifting at least some of its marketing efforts to young adults, where the arguments that public health advocates have mounted about smoking and children do not apply. Smoking is increasing among college-age students (aged [18][19][20][21][22][23][24], 85,86 and young adults (aged 21-30) represent a substantial percentage of bar patrons. 87 The industry explicitly protected bars as promotional venues in the Master Settlement Agreement that settled lawsuits that the states brought against the tobacco industry.…”