Scholars have argued that we have good reason to defend the Epicurean view of
the validity of sensation on the basis of a contextual reading of the
content of perception. More specifically, it has been suggested that we can
respond to skeptical challenges by acknowledging the contextual character of
perceptual content and by linking its truth to the conditions under which it
occurs. By examining these proposals, we identify some sources of concern
and point out the limitations in providing an adequate framework for the
Epicurean idea that the senses are capable of providing the ultimate
criteria of truth. In particular, we argue that we should be wary of a
contextual reading of perceptual content, not only because this is not a
viable model for reliably distinguishing truth from falsity, but also
because it is not adequately supported by the available textual evidence of
Epicurean empiricist epistemology. Finally, we point out further problems
for the Epicurean viewpoint by drawing on some later considerations in the
history of the philosophy of perception.