Environmental taxes and strategic delegation

Bárcena‐Ruiz, Juan Carlos; Garzón, Marı́a Begoña

doi:10.1007/s101080200052

Cited by 21 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…It argues that a switch from pure profit maximization to strategic managerial delegation leads to higher emission taxes and environmental damage. This paper differs from Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2002) in two important aspects. First, this paper examines the impact of strategic managerial delegation on emission taxes under alternative modes of product market competition: price and quantity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…We note that Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2002) examine the impact of strategic managerial delegation on emission taxes considering homogeneous product Cournot duopoly. It argues that a switch from pure profit maximization to strategic managerial delegation leads to higher emission taxes and environmental damage.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, this paper allows for product differentiation and examines the role of product differentiation explicitly. Therefore, the analysis of this paper encompasses the analysis of Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2002) as a special case.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It demonstrates that effects of strategic managerial delegation on emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare crucially depend on the mode of product market competition. It also implies that the results of Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2002) go through in the case of differentiated product quantity competition, but do not hold in the case of price competition.…”

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confidence: 97%

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Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly*

Pal

2011

The Manchester School

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This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of competition. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation. Moreover, the impacts of delegation on the scope for the optimal emission tax rate to be lower for higher degree of product differentiation are very different under alternative modes of competition. Under price (quantity) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare are lower (higher) in the case of delegation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 84%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 97%

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Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly*

Pal

2011

The Manchester School

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“…For example, sequential entry(Church and Ware, 1996), mixed oligopoly(White, 2001), equivalence of price and quantity competition(Miller and Pazgal, 2001), mergers(Gonzalez- Maestre and Lopez-Cunat, 2001;Ziss, 2001), choice of incentive scheme(Jansen et al, 2007), wage bargaining(Szymanski, 1994), delegation to bureaucrats(Basu et al, 1997), trade policy(Das, 1997), environmental damage control(Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon, 2002), to name a few.2 The same person serving as member of the board of directors of many firms of the same industry can also induce and/or facilitate coordination among firms to design delegation contracts cooperatively.3 Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) have studied the impact of cooperative managerial delegation on cartel stability.C 2010 The Author. Journal compilation C 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research.…”

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confidence: 99%

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION, R&D AND COLLUSION

Pal

2010

Bulletin of Econ Res

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Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full-collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semicollusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct.

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External bargaining versus internal manipulation: A theory of managerial delegation

Wang

2020

Manage Decis Econ

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Does the competition mode influence the delegation decisions of the firm owners? By constructing a vertical negotiation game model, we find that under Cournot competition in the downstream market, the downstream firm's owner will not choose delegation, whereas under Bertrand competition, the downstream firm's owner will choose delegation. If the product substitution is relatively large, the adoption of delegation management by the owners of downstream firms under Bertrand competition will bring higher profits. It further shows that compared with the situation of no delegation, delegation management may reverse the social welfare ranking under Bertrand and Cournot competitions.

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Environmental taxes and strategic delegation

Cited by 21 publications

References 8 publications

Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly*

Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly*

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION, R&D AND COLLUSION

External bargaining versus internal manipulation: A theory of managerial delegation

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