Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

Canton, Joan; Soubeyran, Antoine; Stahn, Hubert

doi:10.1007/s10640-007-9158-8

Cited by 70 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…, which is the first for which it is optimal to stop the production8 4 . If we now keep bear in mind that the total production level A of abatement goods is given, the index of this firm can be obtained by making sure that the total level of production of firms…”

Section: Social Benefits and Costs From Pollution Abatementmentioning

confidence: 99%

About polluting eco-industries: optimal provision of abatement goods and Pigouvian fees

Sans

Schwartz²,

Stahn

2017

Environmental Economics

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(2017). About polluting eco-industries: optimal provision of abatement goods and Pigouvian fees. Environmental Economics, 8(3), 46-61. doi:10.21511 In this article, the authors introduce a polluting eco-industry. Depending on the level of damage, there are two optimal equilibria. If the damage is low, one generalizes the usual results of the economic literature to the polluting eco-industry: the dirty firm partially abates their emissions, only efficient eco-industry firms produce and the abatement level increases with the damage. However, very specific results are obtained if the damage is high. In this case, not all efficient eco-industry firms produce. The abatement level and the number of active eco-industry firms both decrease as the damage increases. The authors finally show that a well-designed Pigouvian tax implements these equilibria in a competitive economy.

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Section: Social Benefits and Costs From Pollution Abatementmentioning

confidence: 99%

About polluting eco-industries: optimal provision of abatement goods and Pigouvian fees

Sans

Schwartz²,

Stahn

2017

Environmental Economics

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“…In the context of an imperfect market structure, there is a trade-off between the social gain from emission abatement and the social loss from monopolistic or oligopolistic output restriction, which the regulator has to take into account when setting the tax rate (Lee, 1975;Barnett, 1980). Second, there is a growing literature studying environmental policies in the presence of imperfectly competitive eco-industries (Requate, 2005;David and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2005;Canton et al, 2008;David et al, 2011;David and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2010). The term 'eco-industries' is used to refer to providers of abatement goods and services, such as the producers of RES-E equipment discussed in the present paper.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subsidies for renewable energies in the presence of learning effects and market power

Reichenbach¹,

Requate

2012

Resource and Energy Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Subsidies for Renewable Energies in the Presence of Learning Effects and Market PowerJohanna Reichenbach, Till Requate Abstract: We study the impact of learning by doing, learning spill-overs, and imperfect competition in a model with two types of electricity producers, an oligopolistic sector of polluting fossil-fuel utilities and a competitive fringe of non-polluting generators of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E). Furthermore we consider an upstream industry of RES-E equipment producers engaged in learning by doing. We show that a first-best policy requires two instruments, a tax in the fossil-fuel sector and an output subsidy for RES-E equipment producers. We then study second-best-optimal feed-in tariffs that are paid to the generators of RES-E. By means of simulations we calculate the welfare loss of a second-best-optimal feed-in-tariff policy and analyze how market structure impacts on second-best-optimal feed-in tariffs.

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“…Acknowledging this development, the economic literature has lately re-examined optimal environmental policies in the presence of an eco-industry, assuming the economy is either closed (David & Sinclair-Desgagné 2005, Nimubona & Sinclair-Desgagné 2005, Requate 2005, Canton et al 2008 or open (Fees & Muehlheusser 2002, Copeland 2005, Canton 2007). These articles, however, did not study how environmental regulation affects concentration and mergers in the eco-industry.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental Regulation and Horizontal Mergers in the Eco-Industry

2008

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Environmental Regulation and Horizontal Mergers in the Ecoindustry SummaryThis paper considers the environmental policy and welfare implications of a merger between environment firms (i.e., firms managing environmental resources or supplying pollution abatement goods and services). The traditional analysis of mergers in Cournot oligopolies is extended in two ways. First, we show how environmental policy affects the incentives of environment firms to merge. Second, we stress that mergers in the ecoindustry impact welfare beyond what is observed in other sectors, due to an extra effect on pollution abatement efforts; this might lead to disagreements between an anti-trust agency seeking to limit market concentration which can be detrimental to consumer surplus and a benevolent regulator who maximizes total welfare.

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Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

Abstract: Eco-industry, End-of-pipe pollution abatement, Environmental taxation, Vertical Cournot oligopolies, D43, H23, Q58,

Cited by 70 publications

References 15 publications

About polluting eco-industries: optimal provision of abatement goods and Pigouvian fees

About polluting eco-industries: optimal provision of abatement goods and Pigouvian fees

Subsidies for renewable energies in the presence of learning effects and market power

Environmental Regulation and Horizontal Mergers in the Eco-Industry

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