Environmental policy regulation and corporate compliance in evolutionary game models with well-mixed and structured populations

Rocha, André Barreira da Silva; Salomão, Gabriel Meyer

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2019.05.040

Cited by 84 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Enterprises are regarded as important subjects to perform sustainable practice, who should take ecological environment into account and promote the coordinated and sustainable development of economy and ecological environment [6,7]. Due to the complexity of green sustainable practices, the incentives of enterprises are not only driven by commercial demand and environmental protection [8,9], but also the responsibility of enterprises to pursue environmental sustainability [10,11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Firm Performance on Green Sustainable Practices through Managers’ Ascribed Responsibility and Waste Management: Green Self-Efficacy as Moderator

Guo

Liu

et al. 2019

Sustainability

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Firms’ performance in sustainable development has caused increasing concerns. A key issue is that the environmental characteristics of business managers may be an important driver to promote the sustainable practice of enterprises. This study explores the relationship between ascribed responsibility of managers and green sustainable practice of enterprises by introducing the waste management as mediation variable and green self-efficacy as a moderating variable. A survey was conducted in manufacturing enterprises from the Yangtze River Delta in China in 2019, where 149 valid questionnaires were collected out of 200 surveyed enterprises. Subsequently, the data were analyzed through an analytic hierarchy process. The results show that: (1) ascribed responsibility of managers has a positive impact on green sustainable practices (β = 0.428, p < 0.001), and waste management plays a full mediating role during this process (β = 0.428, p < 0.001); (2) managers' green self-efficacy strengthens the positive impact of waste management on sustainable practices (β = 0.284, p < 0.05); (3) green self-efficacy has positively moderated the indirect effect of managers' ascribed responsibility for sustainable practice through waste management. The research enriches the theories on sustainable practice of enterprises from the perspective of managers’ environmental characteristics and provides insights for enterprises to promote sustainable development practice.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Firm Performance on Green Sustainable Practices through Managers’ Ascribed Responsibility and Waste Management: Green Self-Efficacy as Moderator

Guo

Liu

et al. 2019

Sustainability

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“…If the degree of risk aversion is the enterprise's private information, in reality, the enterprise might pretend to be more risk averse to induce the government to err in incentive, which may yield interesting insights. Finally, only the traditional linear compensation contract and fully rational players have been considered, the quota-based compensation plan (see [15]) and the behavioral characteristics model (see [6,18]) should also be investigated. Future work could include consideration of the emission reductions among multiple stakeholders simultaneously, including the central governments, local governments, enterprise, supervisory authorities, retailers, residents and the consumers, and extending the primal model to more complex monitoring settings (see [10]).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monitoring strategies of enterprise’s emission reduction with asymmetric information

et al. 2021

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More recently, the Chinese Government had been making appreciable efforts to stimulate and encourage entrepreneurial emission reductions. These efforts could be boosted by availability of dual asymmetric information about the adopted technology for efficient reduction and enterprises' investment strategies, possibly leading to adverse selection and moral hazard. This paper incorporates Stackelberg game model and incentive mechanism theory to find a feasible solution to dual asymmetric information problem. Hence firstly, through application of linear function of the total emission, an emission reduction contract would be formulated for regulating incentive payments from government to supervisory authorities followed by derivation of a two stage principal-agent monitoring model based on the enterprise's private information and action respectively. Some findings have been obtained through analysis of the monitoring models along with their comparison with the results of no monitoring scenario which confirm the effectiveness of hiring the supervisory authorities for monitoring of enterprises' emission reduction, which, ultimately, would facilitate increasing payoff and efficient emission reduction. In this perspective, the action-based monitoring mechanism depicts overall government dominance. Several, managerial insights have also been provided for various scenarios and propositions and all the findings are illustrated numerically. It could prove highly beneficial and significant to the government in encouraging entrepreneurial emission reductions.

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“…Sun and Zhang (2019) divided enterprises into two types, dominant and inferior, and analyzed the evolutionarily stable strategy of heterogeneous enterprises in preventing greenwashing. Rocha and Salomao (2019) presented an evolutionary game to study the interaction between polluting firms and auditors. For a tripartite game model, Duan et al (2016) developed two systems of dynamics-based tripartite evolutionary game models: a government environmental regulation-static punishment model and a dynamic punishment model.…”

Section: Differential Game Models In Espsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Coordinated Regulation of New Energy Vehicles Based on Dynamic Bayesian Game

Liu

Song

Chang

et al. 2021

Front. Environ. Sci.

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Manufacturers are disseminating false or ambiguous information regarding new energy vehicles (NEVs), which has led to skepticism from consumers about the quality of NEVs. In this research, we simultaneously considered the relationship among manufacturers, consumers, and governments from the perspective of stakeholders, and then we analyzed the tripartite coordinated regulation. In view of the serious information asymmetry of NEVs, we innovatively developed the Bayesian dynamic game model. By solving refined Bayesian equilibrium strategies, this study explores the effects of key influencing factors on strategic choices. On the basis of the conclusion, relevant countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to engender effective regulation by governments.

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Environmental policy regulation and corporate compliance in evolutionary game models with well-mixed and structured populations

Cited by 84 publications

References 32 publications

Understanding Firm Performance on Green Sustainable Practices through Managers’ Ascribed Responsibility and Waste Management: Green Self-Efficacy as Moderator

Understanding Firm Performance on Green Sustainable Practices through Managers’ Ascribed Responsibility and Waste Management: Green Self-Efficacy as Moderator

Monitoring strategies of enterprise’s emission reduction with asymmetric information

Tripartite Coordinated Regulation of New Energy Vehicles Based on Dynamic Bayesian Game

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