Environmental policy contests: command and control versus taxes

Cardona, Daniel; Freitas, Jenny De; Rubí‐Barceló, Antoni

doi:10.1007/s10797-020-09631-4

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 37 publications

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“…Our study contributes to the literature dealing with policy contests, in particular analyzing situations whereby contestants select their policy proposals endogenously. See, for instance, Epstein and Nitzan (2004, 2007), Münster (2006), Cardona and Rubí‐Barceló (2016), Cardona et al (2018, 2021), or Venkatesh (2020). Nevertheless, none of these papers consider the share contest, as analyzed in Dickson et al (2018) or Duggan and Gao (2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying policy makers: Share versus lottery contests

Cardona

Freitas

Rubí‐Barceló

2022

J Public Economic Theory

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In lobbying competition to influence a policy ranging over a continuum, lottery and share contests can be regarded as two alternative conflict resolution protocols. In the lottery contest, the policy is selected probabilistically whereas in the share contest the policy choice is deterministic. Although these two contest settings are equivalent for risk‐neutral lobbyists, this equivalence fails to hold when they are risk‐averse. We demonstrate that when lobbyists have concave preferences over policies and select their policy proposals, they strategically moderate their claims only under the (probabilistic) lottery setting. This action defuses the conflict and reduces the exerted effort. Consequently, risk‐averse contestants might unanimously prefer the lottery to the share contest.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying policy makers: Share versus lottery contests

Cardona

Freitas

Rubí‐Barceló

2022

J Public Economic Theory

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A Comparative Analysis of South Africa’s Carbon Pricing Policy in the Power and Energy-Intensive Industries

Makamela,

Ramfol

2024

Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics

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Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members

2022

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We analyze the choice of the policy platform that a group of heterogeneous challengers will support to confront the current policy in a subsequent contest between them and the status-quo defenders. The choice of this alternative policy will affect not only the incentives of challengers to get involved in the conflict (intra-group effect), but also the mobilization of status-quo defenders (inter-group effect). We disentangle these two effects and show that the degree of polarization (distance between the alternative and the status-quo policy) depends on how the efforts that groups exert in the contest affect their winning probabilities. Our results illustrate how the conflict resolution rules may affect the degree of polarization in political confrontations.

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Environmental policy contests: command and control versus taxes

Cited by 6 publications

References 37 publications

Lobbying policy makers: Share versus lottery contests

Lobbying policy makers: Share versus lottery contests

A Comparative Analysis of South Africa’s Carbon Pricing Policy in the Power and Energy-Intensive Industries

Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members

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