2008
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1951
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Environmental Policy and Uncertain Arrival of Future Abatement Technology

Abstract: We study long-term incentives for regulated polluting firms to invest in advanced abatement technologies when some new technology is available but even better technology is expected for the future. Firms can invest only once. We find that, depending on the cost of adoption, all possible investment patterns can occur in social optimum. Further, a regulator who anticipates the arrival of the new technology can decentralize the socially optimal allocations by announcing either a Pigouvian tax or tradable permits … Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…If the arrive time of new technology is unknown, non-tradable quotas can encourage firms to adopt the energy-saving technology earlier than taxes under the low levels of environmental stringency, while the opposite conclusion holds for high levels of environmental stringency [19]. On this basis, ex-ante and ex-post regulation are included in the research framework, the economic incentives of taxes and tradable permits on the adoption of new abatement technologies are studied [20]. However, for the end-ofpipe abatement technology, emission standards can encourage firms to make investment decision earlier than taxes under the high levels of environmental stringency, while the opposite conclusion holds for low levels of environmental stringency [21].…”
Section: Uncertaintymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If the arrive time of new technology is unknown, non-tradable quotas can encourage firms to adopt the energy-saving technology earlier than taxes under the low levels of environmental stringency, while the opposite conclusion holds for high levels of environmental stringency [19]. On this basis, ex-ante and ex-post regulation are included in the research framework, the economic incentives of taxes and tradable permits on the adoption of new abatement technologies are studied [20]. However, for the end-ofpipe abatement technology, emission standards can encourage firms to make investment decision earlier than taxes under the high levels of environmental stringency, while the opposite conclusion holds for low levels of environmental stringency [21].…”
Section: Uncertaintymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One important issue when tackling the problem of carbon-production is the intertemporal aspect of the investment, as von Döllen and Requarte [43] argued. The advantage especially of turquoise hydrogen is that for methane-based hydrogen most of the necessary infrastructure is available.…”
Section: Timing Of Investmentsmentioning
confidence: 99%