Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design

Abstract

According to the logic of collective action, mere awareness of the causes of environmental degradation will not motivate rational agents to reduce pollution. Yet some government policies aim to enlist citizens in schemes of voluntary cooperation, drawing on an ethos of collective responsibility. Are such policies doomed to failure? This book provides a novel application of rational choice theory to a large-scale survey of environmental attitudes in The Netherlands. Its main findings are that rational citizens are motivated to cooperate towards a less polluted environment to a large extent, but that their willingness to assume responsibility depends on the social context of the collective action problem they face. This empirical study is an important volume in the development of a more consistent foundation for rational choice theory in policy analysis, which seeks to clarify major theoretical issues concerning the role of moral commitment, self-interest and reciprocity in environmental behaviour.

Sustainable development of small companies: Investors' perspectives

“…To identify whether a preference ordering has a dominant strategy, a choice‐matrix was prepared according to the PD model of game theory. The player with respect to which a dominant strategy is sought is positioned in the row of the matrix (row player) and the other player is placed in the column (column player) (Pellikaan & Veen, ).…”

“…In the scenario presented in the questionnaire, while indicating a preference ranking in making an environmental decision for Little Ltd, the respondents were faced with an “individual entity's (i.e., Little Ltd) preference versus other organizations' practice” dilemma. A preference made in favor of expending resources in pollution control initiatives was considered a “proenvironmental strategy” and the opposing view is deemed to be a “profinancial strategy.” As the scenario presents four choices (A, B, C and D), the number of possible preference orderings across these outcomes will be 24 (i.e., 4 × 3 × 2 × 1) (Pellikaan & Veen, , p. 73). In the first scenario, the two players represent: “individual entity” for which a preferred choice is sought and; “other organizations” which operate in the same region …”

“…The analytical process for identifying the dominant strategy of a respondent follows the method suggested by Pellikaan and Veen (). The process involves two steps: Assigning scores of 1–4 in a highest (4) to lowest (1) order to the choices in the choice‐matrix according to the preference ranking expressed by the respondent.…”

A diagnosis of environmental awareness in sport and sport policy

“…Steering, social context, community and the sociology of law Principally, law and legal regulations form an essential part in the progress of a sustainable environmental development (Hawke 2002, Pellikaan andvan der Veen 2002). Yet, the impact of law as well as of 'law and ecology' has to be examined (Brooks et al 2002).…”

Industry Environmental Agreements and Climate Policy: Learning by Comparison

“…This may lead to voluntarism becoming 'locked-in' as an accepted strategy, however, and legitimate industry arguments that it would experience 'first-mover disadvantages'-the costs of voluntary initiatives plus those of other measures-if these are introduced at a later stage. Similarly, governments may use agreements as a token gesture to give the impression of action while, in reality, endorsing business as usual (Pellikaan & van der Veen, 2002).…”