Environmental and social degradation as the engine of economic growth

Bartolini, Stefano; Bonatti, Luigi

doi:10.1016/s0921-8009(02)00176-3

Cited by 57 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…According to Easterlin (1974), individuals invest too much in the pursuit of higher income underestimating the negative effects on happiness of factors associated to material goods, such as negative externalities depending on relative income and hedonic adaptation. Similar explanations are proposed by Pugno (2004) and Bartolini et al (2002), respectively focusing on the effects of the rise of materialistic culture, and of an aggregate rise of income, on the gap between desired and realised levels of income which induces individuals to increase working hours, thereby crowding out relational time.…”

Section: Relational Goods and Happiness: The Income Crowding Out Hypomentioning

confidence: 78%

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Income, relational goods and happiness

2011

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Our empirical analysis on the determinants of self declared happiness on more than 100,000 individuals from representative samples in 82 world countries does not reject the hypothesis that the time spent for relationships has a significant and positive impact on happiness. This basic nexus helps to understand new unexplored paths in the so called "happiness-income paradox". To illustrate them we show that personal income has two main effects on happiness. The first is a positive relative income effect which depends on individual's ranking within domestic income quantiles. The second is determined by the relationship between income and relational goods. In principle, more productive individuals may substitute (if the income effect prevails over the substitution effect) worked hours with the nonworking time made free for enjoying relationships, when they have strong preferences for them. The problem is that these individuals tend to have ties with their income class peers who share with them a high opportunity cost for the time spent for relationships. Hence, a coordination failure may reduce the joint investment in relational goods (local public goods which need to be co-produced in order to be enjoyed together) and, through this effect, individuals in the highest income quantiles may end up with poorer relational goods. The impact of personal income on happiness through this channel is therefore expected to be negative.

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Section: Relational Goods and Happiness: The Income Crowding Out Hypomentioning

confidence: 78%

“…We have shown in the previous sections that some authors (Bruni et al, 2004, Pugno, 2004, Bartolini et al, 2002 argue that higher income may crowd out relational goods. Our descriptive empirical findings confirm that individuals in the top income deciles spend less time for relationships.…”

Section: The Two Equation Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Income, relational goods and happiness

2011

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“…¿From the above proposition it follows that there can exist at most ten stationary states with x ̸ = Q. 10 These multiple alternative equilibria show very different features. At some of them (the vertices of the square S, point 1 of the Proposition above) all agents make the same choice within each population (either all buy the option or none does so).…”

Section: Dynamics (2) Is Defined In [0 1]mentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental protection mechanisms and technological dynamics

2012

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The paper proposes a new financial mechanism that could be implemented to protect the environment of a tourist region. For this purpose, we investigate the potential consequences of two financial activities, issued by the local government (G) of a region R, which work like contracts between G and, respectively, visitors of R and firms operating in R. According to these contracts, agents who decide to visit R (firms that decide to adopt an environmental friendly technology) have to buy an option that entitle them to get a partial or total reimbursement if environmental quality in R turns out to be sufficiently low (high), namely, below (above) a given predetermined threshold level.Using a two-population evolutionary game model, we analyze the dynamics emerging from the model and prove that under such fund rising mechanism the virtuous equilibrium (in which all firms adopt the pollution-free technology and all agents choose to visit the region) is always locally attractive. Furthermore, we show that the attraction basin of the poverty trap equilibrium (in which no firm adopts the clean technology and no tourist comes the region) can be decreased by raising the reimbursement offered by the local government to the visitors. Finally, using numerical simulations, it can be shown that the dynamics of the model may give rise to another attractive stationary state in correspondence of the environmental quality threshold determined by the government, as well as to a limit cycle that oscillates around the threshold.

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“…At present, it would appear that the costs of exit have become extremely high, if not prohibitively so. 78 Member State governments 'choose' to accept direct intervention into the sovereign domain instead of unilateral withdraw. In Italy, under European pressure, the technocratic Monti government replaced Berlusconi's democratically elected one.…”

Section: Does Eu Rule Conform To the Realist Value Of Popular Sovereimentioning

confidence: 99%

The EU’s democratic deficit in a realist key: multilateral governance, popular sovereignty and critical responsiveness

Beetz

Rossi

2017

Transnational Legal Theory

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This paper provides a realist analysis of the EU's legitimacy. We propose a modification of Bernard Williams' theory of legitimacy, which we term critical responsiveness. For Williams, 'Basic Legitimation Demand + Modernity = Liberalism'. Drawing on that model, we make three claims. (i) The right side of the equation is insufficiently sensitive to popular sovereignty; (ii) The left side of the equation is best thought of as a 'legitimation story': a non-moralised normative account of how to shore up belief in legitimacy while steering clear of both raw domination and ideological distortions. (iii) The EU's current legitimation story draws on a tradition of popular sovereignty that sits badly with the supranational delegation and pooling of sovereign powers. We conclude by suggesting that the EU's legitimation deficit may be best addressed demoicratically, by recovering the value of popular sovereignty at the expense of a degree of state sovereignty.

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Environmental and social degradation as the engine of economic growth

Cited by 57 publications

References 10 publications

Income, relational goods and happiness

Income, relational goods and happiness

Environmental protection mechanisms and technological dynamics

The EU’s democratic deficit in a realist key: multilateral governance, popular sovereignty and critical responsiveness

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