Enterprise Reform and Corporate Governance in Russia: A Quantitative Survey

Abstract

Abstract. The objective of this paper is to verify the range and depth of the study on corporate governance in Russia through a comprehensive survey of 202 research works. With regard to the internal structure of Russian corporations, a great deal of research has been conducted in a relatively short time since the collapse of the Soviet Union by many highly motivated researchers, who have provided insightful perspectives. These achievements, however, place too much emphasis on the empirical analysis of the interrelation between ownership structure and corporate restructuring, leaving some critical themes open for further discussion. As the 21st Century begins, a well-balanced research base should be established in this field in order to identify the reality of Russian corporations from a multifaceted perspective.

The determinants of board composition in a transforming economy: Evidence from Russia

“…They include the pioneering works of Dolgopyatova (1995), Blasi and Shleifer (1996), Afanasiev et al (1997), and Filatotchev et al (1999). Most previous studies, however, simply imply the existence of a close association between ownership structure and board composition in Russian corporations (Iwasaki, 2007b). In addition, there are virtually no empirical works that examine the determinants of board structure in other transition economies.…”

Post‐privatization Ownership and Firm Performance: A Large Meta‐analysis of the Transition Literature

“…However, we also include the test of type II publication selection bias using Eq. (5) because, as repeatedly verified in Iwasaki andTokunaga (2014, 2016) and Tokunaga and Iwasaki (2017), this kind of bias is very likely in the literature of transition economies.…”

“…In fact, from the initial phase of the transition, the view that foreign investors could have a greater impact on firm restructuring than domestic investors was strongly expressed. This was because by bringing in not only vast sums of capital but also advanced production technology and management know-how, as well as other forms of tacit knowledge, foreign investors have a lot of potential for dramatically improving the productivity and efficiency of the firms they own (Iwasaki andTokunaga, 2014, 2016). Furthermore, in the process of being incorporated into the international division-of-labor structure of multinational firms through direct investment, domestic firms have the potential to secure a robust operational foundation that cannot be compared with what they had during the socialist era (Dunning, 1986;Blomstrom and Wolff, 1994;Kogut, 1996).…”

“…Furthermore, the system design and implementation process under privatization policies were extremely opaque, and opportunistic, rent-seeking behavior by politicians and bureaucrats, as well as state capture by managers and entrepreneurs, had a huge impact. Because of this, the selection of acquirers for state-owned assets was unlikely to be fair and fully achievable (Frye, 2002;Iwasaki andSuzuki, 2007, 2012). These factors combined with other problems, such as a lack of strategic investors, including foreign investors, and chronic corruption throughout society, probably served to significantly reduce the impact of privatization in many privatized firms in Russia and other FSU countries (Johnson et al, 2000;Radygin, 2014).…”

“…Furthermore, an analysis performed of quite a number of studies has produced the surprising finding that companies still under state control are actually performing better than their privatized firms. For an example of such a study, see Iwasaki's (2007) systematic review of the Russian literature.…”