Enjoying the Spread: Conscious Externalism Reconsidered

Ward, Dave

doi:10.1093/mind/fzs095

Cited by 43 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Thompson and Cosmelli have thus qualified in a more recent article that 'to perceive is to be in an interactive relationship with the world ' (2011, p. 165;c.f. Noë 2004;Pepper 2014;Ward 2012). Now, this is an understanding that, as I have said, is purported to arise from phenomenological considerations about the nature of perceptual experience.…”

Section: Basic Features Of Enactivismmentioning

confidence: 91%

“…Central to enactivism is the claim that, phenomenologically, perceptual experience is an episode of real-time interaction with the environment (Noë 2004;Thompson and Cosmelli 2011;Ward 2012). Interactivity is purportedly invoked in our most rigorous and accurate phenomenological accounts, themselves held to emerge from the methods of (amongst other things) continental phenomenology and Buddhist mindfulness practice (Colombetti 2014;Depraz et al 2003;Varela and Shear 1999;Varela et al 1991Varela et al / 1993.…”

Section: Enactivist Phenomenology and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A majority of prominent enactivists support the Extended Conscious Mind Thesis (ECM): the material (constitutive) supervenience base of some kinds of experience extends into the environment (Hurley 1998;Noë 2004;Pepper 2014;Thompson and Cosmelli 2011;Ward 2012). The typical candidate here is perceptual experience (Pepper 2014, p. 99).…”

Section: Radical Enactivism: Correcting Inconsistenciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For these reasons, Ward (2012) argues that once enactivists have an interactive phenomenology in play this makes it natural to resist any narrow subpersonal construal of perceptual experience (and in turn favour ECM), for 'the picture of the subpersonal that would result from doing so threatens to make it unintelligible how their conception of things at the personal level could be correct ' (p. 735). And surely enactivists like Hutto and Myin do want to maintain that their proposed phenomenology is correct.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Phenomenological constraints: a problem for radical enactivism

Roberts

2017

Phenom Cogn Sci

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This paper does two things. Firstly, it clarifies the way that phenomenological data is meant to constrain cognitive science according to enactivist thinkers. Secondly, it points to inconsistencies in the 'Radical Enactivist' handling of this issue, so as to explicate the commitments that enactivists need to make in order to tackle the explanatory gap. I begin by sketching the basic features of enactivism in sections 1-2, focusing upon enactive accounts of perception. I suggest that enactivist ideas here rely heavily upon the endorsement of a particular explanatory constraint that I call the structural resemblance constraint (SRC), according to which the structure of our phenomenology ought to be mirrored in our cognitive science. Sections 3-5 delineate the nature of, and commitment to, SRC amongst enactivists, showing SRC's warrant and implications. The paper then turns to Hutto and Myin's (2013) handling of SRC in sections 6-7, highlighting irregularities within their programme for Radical Enactivism on this issue. Despite seeming to favour SRC, I argue that Radical Enactivism's purported compatibility with the narrow (brain-bound) supervenience of perceptual experience is in fact inconsistent with SRC, given Hutto and Myin's phenomenological commitments. I argue that enactivists more broadly ought to resist such a concessionary position if they wish to tackle the explanatory gap, for it is primarily the abidance to SRC that ensures progress is made here. Section 8 then concludes the paper with a series of open questions to enactivists, inviting further justification of the manner in which they apply SRC.

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Section: Basic Features Of Enactivismmentioning

confidence: 91%

Section: Enactivist Phenomenology and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Radical Enactivism: Correcting Inconsistenciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Phenomenological constraints: a problem for radical enactivism

Roberts

2017

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…I think of the transcendental stance as a stance that is readily adopted in a range of strands of situated cognition theories, even though it is rarely made explicit (for exceptions to this rule see Ward 2012 andRowlands 2010). Approaches influenced by phenomenology and/or dynamic systems theory, in particular, are likely to reflect both empirical and transcendental stances.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%