2012
DOI: 10.2172/1059466
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Enhancing safeguards analysts' geospatial usage.

Abstract: This report is the final summation of Sandia's Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project #151316, -Open Source Information Verification‖ (OSIV) which ran from FY11 through FY12. The aim of OSIV was to research, develop, and evaluate relevant geospatial analysis capabilities that address open-source information needs for international safeguards.OSIV generated a number of technical, programmatic, and cultural advances, detailed in this report. There were new methodological insights and researc… Show more

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“…Advanced satellite imaging technology has been an "area of development" in IAEA safeguards work since the mid-1990s. 161 Since that period, the IAEA has used analysis of satellite imagery to assist in its evaluation of site declarations and reports submitted by state parties, in its detection and assessment of undeclared nuclear facilities, and in preparing for (or sometimes prompting the initiation of) safeguards inspections or related visits. 162 Except to the extent that satellite image data are included in information provided by NPT states parties to the IAEA, the data in question are sourced from commercial satellites.…”
Section: Satellites and Citizen Sensorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Advanced satellite imaging technology has been an "area of development" in IAEA safeguards work since the mid-1990s. 161 Since that period, the IAEA has used analysis of satellite imagery to assist in its evaluation of site declarations and reports submitted by state parties, in its detection and assessment of undeclared nuclear facilities, and in preparing for (or sometimes prompting the initiation of) safeguards inspections or related visits. 162 Except to the extent that satellite image data are included in information provided by NPT states parties to the IAEA, the data in question are sourced from commercial satellites.…”
Section: Satellites and Citizen Sensorsmentioning
confidence: 99%