Enhancing Private Sector Participation in India's Defense Production

Behera, Laxman Kumar

doi:10.1080/14751798.2011.604485

Cited by 2 publications

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“…As with China, Indian armaments production is almost entirely embedded within a huge government‐run MIC. The Indian defense industry base consists of eight government‐owned Defense Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), 39 Ordnance Factories (OFs), and, at the top, the powerful Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) (Behera, , pp. 31–34).…”

Section: The Origins and Structure Of The Chinese And Indian Defense mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…31–34). The Indian state‐run defense sector employs more than 1.4 million workers (of which about 105,000 work in the OFs), including some 30,000 scientists and engineers within the DRDO, and in 2010 it enjoyed revenues of approximately US$7.8 billion (Behera, , pp. 31–34; Defense News, 2011).…”

Section: The Origins and Structure Of The Chinese And Indian Defense mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In an effort to formalize technology transfer obligations, the Indian government has over the past decade inaugurated and refined an official defense offsets policy. In the 2000s, the New Delhi's Defense Procurement Procedures (DPP) guidelines outlined three broad acquisition strategies for the Indian armed forces: “Buy,” “Buy and Make,” and “Make.” “Make” refers to military products that would be more or less wholly designed, developed, and manufactured within India; its basic objective is to ensure the maintenance and expansion of indigenous R&D, design, and production capabilities on the part of the local defense sector, both state‐owned and private (Behera, , p. 36). The “Buy” category entails products that are intended to be imported; under the terms of the 2006 DPP, any such arms import greater than three billion rupees (approximately US$67 million) required a minimum 30% direct offset, either in the form of counter‐purchases of Indian defense equipment or foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Indian defense industry (such as codevelopment or coproduction arrangements, or joint international marketing efforts).…”

Section: Reforming the Chinese And Indian Arms Industriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Comparing Defense Industry Reforms in China and India

Bitzinger¹

2015

Asian Politics and Policy

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Most aspiring great powers equate great power status with self‐sufficiency, armaments production. China and India have both invested considerable resources over the past 60 years in establishing and nurturing indigenous military‐industrial complexes (MICs). By the early 1990s, however, it was apparent that both countries’ MICs were inadequate in delivering indigenously developed advanced conventional weaponry to their national militaries, due to technological inferiority and bloated, inefficient state‐owned enterprise systems. Subsequently, both countries have undertaken efforts to reform their respective MICs, by injecting competition and other market‐oriented changes, and by expanding their acquisition of cutting‐edge military (and military‐relevant civilian) technologies. China has made much more progress in reforming and modernizing its MIC, and the results can be seen in the types of vastly improved Chinese weapons systems coming off domestic assembly lines. India's MIC, meanwhile, seems to be still mired in Nehruvian socialist and protectionist past.

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Section: The Origins and Structure Of The Chinese And Indian Defense mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Origins and Structure Of The Chinese And Indian Defense mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Reforming the Chinese And Indian Arms Industriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Comparing Defense Industry Reforms in China and India

Bitzinger¹

2015

Asian Politics and Policy

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Risks in Defence Procurement: India in the 21^stCentury

Kundu

2019

Defence and Peace Economics

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Although there exist several remarkable theories that facilitate the understanding of procurement risks in imperfect market conditions, methods to quantify the impact and identify the most severe risks are less well-known. This paper uses the method of risk analysis to discuss defence procurement challenges in India. An original dataset of 88 contracts has been created to identify the most probable and the most severe causes for poor procurement performance. A schedule performance parameter has been constructed to quantify the impact of different adverse events. The findings display a high probability of technological risks followed by contractual risks as the cause for delays in Indian defence procurement. Technological risks are concentrated in cases of indigenous procurement due to a lack of infrastructure and resources while contractual risks mostly occur in contracts where the Ministry of Defence deals with external agents like foreign suppliers. This indicates frictions and transaction costs. These and other findings from the quantitative data on procurement performance are supplemented by insights from an extensive fieldwork in India which included 53 interviews.

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Enhancing Private Sector Participation in India's Defense Production

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Comparing Defense Industry Reforms in China and India

Comparing Defense Industry Reforms in China and India

Risks in Defence Procurement: India in the 21^stCentury

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Enhancing Private Sector Participation in India's Defense Production

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Comparing Defense Industry Reforms in China and India

Comparing Defense Industry Reforms in China and India

Risks in Defence Procurement: India in the 21stCentury

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Product

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Risks in Defence Procurement: India in the 21^stCentury