Enhanced Cooperation among Stakeholders in PPP Mega-Infrastructure Projects: A China Study

Li, Long; Li, Zhongfu; Lei, Jiang; Wu, Guangdong; Cheng, Daojin

doi:10.3390/su10082791

Cited by 26 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 65 publications

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“…, and D 7 (0, 0, 1). The stability of the local equilibrium point can be obtained by the analysis of the system's Jacobian if a system of differential equations describing population dynamics is known [21], which is…”

Section: Game Players Parameters Meaningsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The final operation of PPP project depended on the cost and benefit of all parties [20]. Li et al found that the supervision strategy was not chosen when the supervision cost of government supervision department was greater than the supervision benefit; it could make private sector consciously provide the high-quality public products/services with the improvement of public participation level [21].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Gao

2020

Sustainability

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The government, investors, and the public have formed a dynamic multi-game relationship on the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) project, but few studies include them in a system to study their win–win solutions. Firstly, we constructed a tripartite game model of the government, investors, and the public based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, the evolutionary process of tripartite strategy behaviors was studied with the system dynamics (SD) model. Finally, the impact of changes in key factors on behavior strategies was studied through sensitivity analysis. The results show the following: (1) In the outsourcing of new energy and power construction PPP projects, the three parties will eventually reach the equilibrium state of {government supervision, public participation, investors effort}, the three parties achieve a win–win situation and the project benefits are the highest at this time, and the public participation will play an important role in promoting the smooth outsourcing of PPP projects. (2) The strategic choices of the government, investors, and the public are sensitive to changes in the corresponding exogenous variables. (3) The security factor plays a crucial role in the choice of public strategy. The public’s choice is not only affected by its own income and cost, but also by the amount of compensation promised by the government and the estimated damage caused by the investor.

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Section: Game Players Parameters Meaningsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Gao

2020

Sustainability

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“…The cooperation and proper management among different stakeholders are crucial for the success of the PPP project (L. Li, Z. F. Li, Jiang, Wu, & Cheng, 2018;Amadi & Carrillo, 2018). Similarly, a successful PPP project should satisfy the requirements of the stakeholders (Liang & Jia, 2018).…”

Section: Assessment Index Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluate Public-Private-Partnership’s Advancement Using Double Hierarchy Hesitant Fuzzy Linguistic Promethee With Subjective and Objective Information From Stakeholder Perspective

Liu

Zhang

2019

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

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Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) as an efficient mode to provide public services through the government and social capital’s cooperation has been in China for more than 30 years. In this paper, we propose an approach to evaluate PPP’s advancement in different areas based on the subjective and objective information fusion. At first, we establish an index system from the perspective of the stakeholder. Then, considering that double hierarchy hesitant fuzzy linguistic term set (DHHFLTS) that has two hierarchies of linguistic term sets can describe the subjective linguistic information more accurately, it is applied in the paper to depict the subjective information. By applying the entropy of the DHHFLTS, a programming model is proposed to derive the attribute weight through combining subjective evaluation with objective data. In addition, we develop the double hierarchy hesitant fuzzy linguistic PROMETHEE combining the subjective and objective information (DHHFL-PROMETHEE-S&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;O) method. At last, we illustrate the index system and the method with the PPP’s advancement evaluation problem, and we can find the best choice based on the ranking result. Meanwhile, we also find that the objective information and the subjective information are complementary in the evaluation process.

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“…Guo, et al [58] conducted research on the quality supervision activities among construction stakeholders by using evolutionary game theory. Li [59] constructed a mathematical model to enhance cooperation among stakeholders in PPP mega-infrastructure projects. Sun [60] constructed a model for construction employers, workers and government to analyze their attitudes towards vocational skills trainings.…”

Section: Use Of Evolutionary Game Theory In Construction Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Private Investors Conduct Strategies by Governments Supervising Public-Private Partnership Projects in the New Media Era

et al. 2018

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Private investors and governments need to cooperate in public-private partnership (PPP) projects but the private investors may be in pursuit of their own profit by conducting defaulting behaviors which causes various environmental problems and economic risks. However, the information asymmetry between them makes it difficult to supervise the behaviors of private investors. The development of internet and social media creates new environment for the information spread and people are using new media increasingly in the current society, providing an inexpensive and viable way for the public to participate in PPP projects. We constructed a dynamic evolutionary model to analyze the behaviors strategies of governments and private investors in the new media era and then analyzed how important factors influence the behavior trends of governments and private investors. These findings could provide meaningful insight to improve supervision status by using the new media environment and predict the behaviors of governments and private investors in PPP projects, which would be conductive for the governments to supervise the private investors in PPP projects more efficiently.

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Enhanced Cooperation among Stakeholders in PPP Mega-Infrastructure Projects: A China Study

Cited by 26 publications

References 65 publications

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Evaluate Public-Private-Partnership’s Advancement Using Double Hierarchy Hesitant Fuzzy Linguistic Promethee With Subjective and Objective Information From Stakeholder Perspective

Analysis of Private Investors Conduct Strategies by Governments Supervising Public-Private Partnership Projects in the New Media Era

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