Enhance Fuzzy Vault Security Using Nonrandom Chaff Point Generator

Nguyen, Minh Tan; Trương, Quang Hải; Dang, Tran Khanh

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-12778-1_16

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The inverse of the projection matrix can be computed and the original template recovered from the transformed version. Similar limitations are found in approaches based on linear projection and fuzzy vault (Nguyen et al, 2016) as well as random orthonormal projection and fuzzy commitment scheme (Nguyen et al, 2015). Integrating periodic function transform and fuzzy vault provides improved security and user privacy.…”

Section: Open Issues and Challengesmentioning

confidence: 68%

Cancelable and hybrid biometric cryptosystems: current directions and open research issues

Jegede

2017

Int. j. adv. appl. sci.

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Cancelable and hybrid biometric cryptosystems are two techniques used to offer protection against the security and privacy challenges faced by users of biometric authentication systems. The main objective of this paper is to present a critical review of current and emerging trends as well as open research issues in cancellable and hybrid biometric systems. The study examines cancelable biometrics under two main categories, namely noninvertible transformation and biometric salting. It also explores hybrid cryptosystems as means of providing improved template security and user privacy. The review focusses on the modes of operation, performance accuracy, security and privacy of various types of cancellable and hybrid biometric cryptosystems. It also provides a more comprehensive survey of latest research works in cancellable and hybrid biometric cryptosystems than existing review papers in these fields. The paper will provide readers with up-to-date information on current directions and open research issues in cancelable and hybrid biometric cryptosystems.

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Section: Open Issues and Challengesmentioning

confidence: 68%

Cancelable and hybrid biometric cryptosystems: current directions and open research issues

Jegede

2017

Int. j. adv. appl. sci.

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“…According to Hooda and Gupta [63], fuzzy vault scheme suffers from the difficulty in revoking a compromised vault, which is liable to the cross matching of biometric templates over the databases; it is simple for an invader to stage attacks after statistically analysing points in the vault. ; It is also possible for an invader to exchange his biometric characters with that of the targeted biometric template, consequently thrashing vault validation; finally, if the new template of the genuine user is provisionally exposed, then the attacker can acquire the template during this exposure [64].…”

Section: Biometric Template Protection Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, every component is matched differently, which allow multiple permutations to communicate. Nevertheless, the implementation was focused on regenerating a fixed message [64].…”

Section: Biometric Template Protection Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessment of vulnerabilities of the biometric template protection mechanism

Habibu¹,

Sam²

2018

IJATEE

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In the ever-changing world of global data transmission, the security of data and individual privacy are the growing fears in today's human life worldwide. The major concerns are the protection of the biometric templates in the biometric identification and authentication process. Storage of the biometric template in the database raises the chance of compromising it, hence lead to serious threats and abuse of the person's identity. When an individual's registered biometric data is disclosed, their security and privacy can be compromised. Therefore, public acceptance of biometrics will depend on the system designer's ability to demonstrate that the systems are robust, with low error rates, and tamper proof. If someone's biometric template inside the database is compromised, that consequently might imply identification robbery of that individual. In the recent past, a considerable number of methods for biometric template protection have been published. This article explains, a thorough valuation on numerous attacks and threats associated with the biometric system alongside the biometric template protection, elucidating the measures anticipated to address the threats, to the performance gap and establish the status quo of the current biometric template protection for public acceptance.

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“…Moreover, the blend substitution attack via biometric systems is analyzed in (see Section 4 (iii) for the attack). Recently, Nguyen et al propose a new scheme based on nonrandom chaff point generator to prevent the blend substitution attack. Furthermore, performance and security problems of the fuzzy vault scheme are reported in (see also for security analysis on fingerprint fuzzy vaults).…”

Section: Framework and Previous Work In Key‐binding Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, the system can compute neither the plain queried feature

\overset{Q}{true}

nor the original template

\overset{T}{true}

from any masked template

\overset{H}{true}

and any masked query

{\overset{H}{true}}^{'}

. Hence, any attacker can glance neither

\overset{T}{true}

nor

\overset{Q}{true}

during the authentication procedure of our scheme. Remark As introduced in Section 2.2.3, a new fuzzy vault scheme is proposed recently in to prevent the blend substitution attack. However, as well as the classical scheme of Juels and Sudan , the new scheme is still based on chaff points, and hence, it is difficult to provide several requirements such as (R‐1) and (R‐2) for template protection.…”

Section: Comparison With Fuzzy Vaultmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biometric key‐binding using lattice masking^†

Yasuda

Sugimura

2015

Security Comm Networks

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In biometrics, template protection technology aims to protect the confidentiality of a biometric template (i.e., enrolled biometric information) by certain conversion. Here, we focus on the key-binding approach for template protection. This approach generates a secure template from joint data of a user's specific key with a user's template, and the key can be correctly extracted from the secure template only when a queried biometric feature is close to the plain template. While almost all conventional schemes use the error correcting code technique, we present a new technique based on lattices to give a new key-binding scheme. Our proposed scheme can provide several requirements (e.g., diversity and revocability) for template protection, which cannot be provided by error correcting code based typical schemes such as the fuzzy commitment and the fuzzy vault.

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Enhance Fuzzy Vault Security Using Nonrandom Chaff Point Generator

Cited by 5 publications

References 10 publications

Cancelable and hybrid biometric cryptosystems: current directions and open research issues

Cancelable and hybrid biometric cryptosystems: current directions and open research issues

Assessment of vulnerabilities of the biometric template protection mechanism

Biometric key‐binding using lattice masking^†

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Enhance Fuzzy Vault Security Using Nonrandom Chaff Point Generator

Cited by 5 publications

References 10 publications

Cancelable and hybrid biometric cryptosystems: current directions and open research issues

Cancelable and hybrid biometric cryptosystems: current directions and open research issues

Assessment of vulnerabilities of the biometric template protection mechanism

Biometric key‐binding using lattice masking†

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Product

Resources

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Biometric key‐binding using lattice masking^†