Enforcement costs and regulatory reform: The agency and firm response

Linder, Stephen H.; McBride, Mark E.

doi:10.1016/0095-0696(84)90003-2

Cited by 53 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Eran modelos estáticos donde se aceptaba que las empresas pudiesen desobedecer la ley y se comparaba la eficiencia de impuestos y cuotas. Aportaciones posteriores como las Storey y McCabe (1980), Downing y Kimball (1982), Beavis y Walker (1983), Linder y McBride (1984), siguieron la misma línea y proponían un análisis estático, donde las empresas reaccionaban a una multa esperada. Malik (1990) incorpora a este tipo de estudios la regulación a través de permisos negociables y examina su efectividad cuando los sistemas de inspección y vigilancia no son perfectos.…”

Section: Los Años De Plenitud: La Década De Los Ochentaunclassified

Las principales aportaciones a la teoría de la regulación medioambiental. Los últimos cuarenta años

Grau

2011

EARN

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RESUMEN:En este artículo analizo las principales aportaciones a la teoría de la regulación medioambiental desarrolladas durante los últimos cuarenta años. Inicio este recorrido en los años sesenta con la presentación de las primeras contribuciones. A continuación, abordo el estudio de la década de los setenta, donde me centro de manera preferente en la comparación de las propiedades de los sistemas basados en incentivos económicos y de los basados en cantidades. Seguidamente me adentro en los desarrollos que surgieron durante los ochenta, concentrando mi atención en el análisis de los sistemas de licencias negociables. Por último, analizo cómo en la década de los noventa la regulación medioambiental se orienta hacia la búsqueda de soluciones para los problemas de contaminación global. PALABRAS CLAVE: instrumentos regulación medioambiental.Clasificación JEL: Q58, Q50.

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Section: Los Años De Plenitud: La Década De Los Ochentaunclassified

Las principales aportaciones a la teoría de la regulación medioambiental. Los últimos cuarenta años

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2011

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“…The objective function of the local government can be formulated in various ways, e.g., maximizing net benefit or welfare (Jones and Scotchmer 1990;Lee 1984;Linder and McBride 1984), maximizing utility (Shavell1980; Spiller 1990), minimizing regulatory or social cost (Becker 1968;Stigler 1970;Harford 1978;Malik 1993), maximizing the compliance rate, maximizing the enforcement effort, etc. While an objective formulation may have its own merits and shortcomings, it has, to a great extent, something to do with the environmental settings under discussion.…”

Section: Expected Payoffs Of the Local Government And The Firmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ignoring them will cause inefficiency and a failure to meet the designated objectives of a particular environmental regulation (Downing and Watson 1974;Greenwood and McAfee 1991;Harford 1978;Linder and McBride 1984;and Viscusi and Zeckhauser 1979). A firm's efforts to influence the local government through various kinds of strategic behavior such as lobbying and bribing are also important factors in modeling environmental enforcement.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bribery, hierarchical government, and incomplete environmental enforcement

Huang

Chu

2004

Environ Econ Policy Stud

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A two-player model is established in order to examine the effects of environmental policy instruments, budget control, and bribery on decision making of local government and the firms. With or without bribery, the central government can always promote the abatement input by stipulating a higher marginal budget reward for the local government. Bribery can cause policy failure for some environmental instruments such as fines and local fine shares. In a clean society, a higher local fine share or higher fines will unambiguously increase pollution abatement. In a corrupt society, a higher local fine share or higher fines may reduce pollution abatement. With or without bribery, a stricter emission standard has an ambiguous effect on pollution abatement.

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“…• Following Linder and McBride (1984), assume a fine, F, for illegal dumping is set by a national agency with the responsibility of enforcement left to the local agency. The local agency's goal is to use their budget efficiently to correctly identify any violations of the law [Crocker (1984)].…”

Section: A Model Of Illegal Dumpingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation

Nowell

Shogren

1994

J Regul Econ

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If a firm can contest the enforcement of an environmental regulation, then neither increasing the probability nor severity of the fine will guarantee a reduction in the illegal dumping of waste. The only policy that unambiguously decreases illegal dumping is lowering the price at legal dump sites because increasing the probability or severity triggers investment into a legal war chest to challenge the fine, while a decrease in the costs of legal dumping does not. If the regulator can only imperfectly monitor a firm's behavior so the firm can be accused of another firm's behavior, then strategic commitment to challenge enforcement will lead to overinvestment in the legal war chest, an increased fraction of illegal dumping, and an overall increase in total costs relative to the nonstrategic case. Disciplines Agricultural and Resource Economics | Behavioral Economics | Natural Resource Economics AbstractIf a firm can contest the enforcement of an environmental regulation, then neither increasing the probability nor severity of the fine will guarantee a reduction in the illegal dumping of waste.The only policy that unambiguously decreases illegal dumping is lowering the price at legal dump sites because increasing the probability or severity triggers investment into a legal war chest to challenge the fine, while a decrease in the costs of legal dumping does not. If the regulator can only imperfectly monitor a firm's behavior so the firm can be accused of another firm's behavior, then strategic commitment to challenge enforcement will lead to overinvestment in the legal war chest, an increased fraction of illegal dumping, and an overall increase in total costs relative to the nonstrategic case.Four out of every five decisions I make are contested in court.

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Enforcement costs and regulatory reform: The agency and firm response

Cited by 53 publications

References 5 publications

Las principales aportaciones a la teoría de la regulación medioambiental. Los últimos cuarenta años

Las principales aportaciones a la teoría de la regulación medioambiental. Los últimos cuarenta años

Bribery, hierarchical government, and incomplete environmental enforcement

Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation

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