2017
DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2017.1307130
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Enforcement Actions and Auditor Changes

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Cited by 18 publications
(14 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…Future research would benefit from a further investigation of the impact of PCAOB inspections on other audit quality dimensions of small audit firms over time. Furthermore, future research could advance our insights on the impact of public oversight by contributing to the limited research on its effects in other parts of the world (e.g., Brocard et al, 2018;Carson et al, 2017;Sundgren & Svanström, 2017). For example, researchers could exploit the European setting where there is substantial variation in inspection regimes in terms of for example frequency of inspections, disclosure of inspections and enforcement of sanctions.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Future research would benefit from a further investigation of the impact of PCAOB inspections on other audit quality dimensions of small audit firms over time. Furthermore, future research could advance our insights on the impact of public oversight by contributing to the limited research on its effects in other parts of the world (e.g., Brocard et al, 2018;Carson et al, 2017;Sundgren & Svanström, 2017). For example, researchers could exploit the European setting where there is substantial variation in inspection regimes in terms of for example frequency of inspections, disclosure of inspections and enforcement of sanctions.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(2008) provide evidence of important losses for KPMG‐Germany following a high‐level audit scandal. Furthermore, the external two‐tier audit quality enforcement system is likely to incentivize firms to avoid being ‘named and shamed’ as a consequence of failed audits (Hitz et al ., 2012; Brocard et al ., 2018). In line with these incentives, audit firms are likely to institute strict controls on the audit assignments, together with standardized working procedures and centralized decision making.…”
Section: Institutional Setting Prior Literature and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To emphasize reputational concerns, we exploited the establishment of a two‐tier ‘naming and shaming’ provision to enforce audit quality uniformity for listed firms, set up in 2005 as part of the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP). Specifically, we used the 2005 FREP adoption as a ‘shock’ to determine if these new regulations constrained individual auditor style effects (see also Brocard et al ., 2018). Despite regulators’ aims to increase audit quality and uniformity, we did not find a significant reduction in engagement or review partner style effects in the post‐2005 period.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, US studies find restatement announcements are associated with improved corporate governance as evidenced by changes to the board of directors (Johnstone et al 2011), to the audit committee members (Carver 2014), that can result in changing the audit firm (Mande and Son 2013). In Germany, Brocard et al (2018) find that auditor changes are more likely to occur before the announcement of the restatement, and firms tend to change from non-Big4 to Big4 auditors. This finding suggests that misstatement clients seek the reputation of Big4 auditors, and Ebner et al (2017) find similar results supporting the "labeling" effect of auditor change resulting in the switch to a more reputable auditor.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This finding suggests that misstatement clients seek the reputation of Big4 auditors, and Ebner et al (2017) find similar results supporting the "labeling" effect of auditor change resulting in the switch to a more reputable auditor. The findings that Big4 auditors do not hesitate to take over as clients the misstatement firms has been attributed to the limited auditor liability in Europe by Brocard et al (2018), and in Asia by Hasnan et al (2013). Thus, non-US studies provide mixed evidence as to whether the benefits of mandatory auditor partner rotation outweigh the costs.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%