Energy Taxes, the Climate Change Convention, and Economic Competitiveness

Müller, Frank G.

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-60365-5_27

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…In that connection one has to keep in mind that any solution below the global level entails serious additional problems of free rider-behaviour. 5 Amongst other things, the implications of this free riderbehaviour have so far been seen in the fact that none of the leading industrialized nations is willing to play a pioneering role in intrqducing climate taxes (MULLER 1995). This national wait-and-see attitude in the follow-up process to Rio has led to an environmental policy standstill in the field of global climate protection.…”

Section: International Free Riders Push Negotiated Agreements In Climmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voluntary agreements in environmental protection: experiences in Germany and future perspectives

1997

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Proponents of voluntary agreements argue that this instrument provides incentives to the business sector for the development of efficient, innovative and environmentally-friendly solutions. Analysing the examples mentioned above, we conclude that it is hard to detect solutions derserving such attributes. These agreements are unlikely to produce results that go beyond what industry would have done in any case and they avoid using economic incentives. The agreements are' non-binding and unenforceable, with the negotiating process leading to a watering down of the environmental goals government had originally aimed at. A preference for negotiated solutions on principle, as currently espoused by the Federal Government in Germany, seems to be "counterproductive". If the government clearly signals its willingness to refrain from using regulatory or economic instruments in favour of industry agreements, it weakens its negotiating position. The government also limits its options should the implementation of the agreement prove unsatisfactory. Government needs to be ,In control" in order to leave its choice of policy instruments open and to be flexible. In a last step, we derive some general conlusions concerning reasonable strategies and applications of voluntary agreements within the European Union. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: International Free Riders Push Negotiated Agreements In Climmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voluntary agreements in environmental protection: experiences in Germany and future perspectives

1997

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In that connection one has to keep in mind that any solution below the global level entails serious additional problems of free rider-behaviour. 4 Amongst other things, the implications of this free rider-behaviour have so far been seen in the fact that none of the leading industrialized nations is willing to play a pioneering role in introducing climate taxes (Muller, 1995). This national wait-and-see attitude in the follow-up process to Rio has led to an environmental policy standstill in the ®eld of global climate protection.…”

Section: Choosing the Decision-making Level And Process Internationalmentioning

confidence: 99%