Energy efficient and side-channel secure hardware architecture for lightweight cipher SIMON

Singh, Arvind; Chawla, Nikhil; Kar, Monodeep; Mukhopadhyay, Saibal

doi:10.1109/hst.2018.8383906

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…have shown that unrolled implementations of 128-bit SIMON (to 6 th degree) improves power side-channel attack resistance. Their CPA attack targeted round 3 output (combinational) with a 1b hamming weight (HW) leakage model but failed to show an attack even with 500K traces, showing inability to extract leakage in time-domain [23]. Author in [12] demonstrated a general Degenerate Grouping Power Attack (DGPA) on different configurations of SIMON and SPECK and showed a successful attack with up to 4 th degree of unrolling (r=4).…”

Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…al. have shown 6-round unrolled SIMON-128 implementation being resistant to power-side channel attacks with no key recovery possible even with 500K traces [23]. The authors have targeted flop output and shown the infeasibility of modeling power due to increased key dependencies.…”

Section: B Successful Key Recovery With Proposed Leakage Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, 6-round unrolled SIMON can be easily attacked with respect to known-ciphertext attacks as the last clock cycle only performs 2 rounds of operation (SIMON-128 has 68 rounds and each cycle in a 6round unrolled datapath executes 6 rounds with the last cycle executing only 2 rounds). Therefore, we attack a 7-round unrolled SIMON to demonstrate leakage extraction in combinational circuits of unrolled datapaths, as it is advantageous over 6-round unrolled datapath presented in [23] with respect to both known plaintext and ciphertext attacks.…”

Section: B Successful Key Recovery With Proposed Leakage Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Extracting side-channel leakage from round unrolled implementations of lightweight ciphers

Chawla

Singh

Rahman

et al. 2019

EasyChair Preprints

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Energy efficiency and security is a critical requirement for computing at edge nodes. Unrolled architectures for lightweight cryptographic algorithms have been shown to be energy-efficient, providing higher performance while meeting resource constraints. Hardware implementations of unrolled datapaths have also been shown to be resistant to side channel analysis (SCA) attacks due to a reduction in signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and an increased complexity in the leakage model. This paper demonstrates optimal leakage models and an improved CFA attack which makes it feasible to extract first-order side-channel leakages from combinational logic in the initial rounds of unrolled datapaths. Several leakage models, targeting initial rounds, are explored and 1-bit hamming weight (HW) based leakage model is shown to be an optimal choice. Additionally, multi-band narrow bandpass filtering techniques in conjunction with correlation frequency analysis (CFA) is demonstrated to improve SNR by up to 4×, attributed to the removal of the misalignment effect in combinational logics and signal isolation.  The improved CFA attack is performed on side channel signatures acquired for 7-round unrolled SIMON datapaths, implemented on Sakura-G (XILINX spartan 6, 45nm) based FPGA platform and a 24× reduction in minimum-traces-to-disclose (MTD) for revealing 80% of the key bits is demonstrated with respect to conventional time domain correlation power analysis (CPA). Finally, the proposed method is successfully applied to a fully-unrolled datapath for PRINCE and a parallel round-based datapath for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm to demonstrate its general applicability.

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Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Successful Key Recovery With Proposed Leakage Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Successful Key Recovery With Proposed Leakage Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Extracting side-channel leakage from round unrolled implementations of lightweight ciphers

Chawla

Singh

Rahman

et al. 2019

EasyChair Preprints

Self Cite

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“…But there are optimal countermeasures or modes of operation targeted for lightweight ciphers that lead to acceptable results. Particularly, SIMON with a round unrolled datapath architecture that enhances vulnerability against a power SCA and yet increases throughput and reduces energy per encryption (pJ/encryption), has been presented in [1,2]. Likewise, PRINCE with unrolled architecture implementation with countermeasures against power SCA has also been proposed [3].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Residual vulnerabilities to power side channel attacks of lightweight ciphers cryptography competition finalists

Mozipo

Acken

2023

IET Computers & Digital Tech

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The protection of communications between Internet of Things (IoT) devices is of great concern because the information exchanged contains vital sensitive data. Malicious agents seek to exploit those data to extract secret information about the owners or the system. Power side channel attacks are of great concern on these devices because their power consumption unintentionally leaks information correlatable to the device's secret data. Several studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of authenticated encryption with advanced data, in protecting communications with these devices. A comprehensive evaluation of the seven (out of 10) algorithm finalists of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) IoT lightweight cipher competition that do not integrate built‐in countermeasures is proposed. The study shows that, nonetheless, they still present some residual vulnerabilities to power side channel attacks (SCA). For five ciphers, an attack methodology as well as the leakage function needed to perform correlation power analysis (CPA) is proposed. The authors assert that Ascon, Sparkle, and PHOTON‐Beetle security vulnerability can generally be assessed with the security assumptions “Chosen ciphertext attack and leakage in encryption only, with nonce‐misuse resilience adversary (CCAmL1)” and “Chosen ciphertext attack and leakage in encryption only with nonce‐respecting adversary (CCAL1)”, respectively. However, the security vulnerability of GIFT‐COFB, Grain, Romulus, and TinyJambu can be evaluated more straightforwardly with publicly available leakage models and solvers. They can also be assessed simply by increasing the number of traces collected to launch the attack.

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Side-Channel-Attack Resistant Dual-Rail Asynchronous-Logic AES Accelerator Based on Standard Library Cells

Chong

Shreedhar

Lwin

et al. 2019

2019 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST)

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Energy efficient and side-channel secure hardware architecture for lightweight cipher SIMON

Cited by 6 publications

References 14 publications

Extracting side-channel leakage from round unrolled implementations of lightweight ciphers

Extracting side-channel leakage from round unrolled implementations of lightweight ciphers

Residual vulnerabilities to power side channel attacks of lightweight ciphers cryptography competition finalists

Side-Channel-Attack Resistant Dual-Rail Asynchronous-Logic AES Accelerator Based on Standard Library Cells

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