Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly model

Naya, José Méndez

doi:10.1007/s00712-014-0416-2

Cited by 21 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Lu and Poddar () considered endogenous timing for both capacity and quantities supplied under a homogeneous Cournot mixed duopoly, and found that various timing patterns emerge. Bárcena‐Ruiz and Garzón (), Matsumura and Ogawa (), and Naya () examined the effect of partial privatisation on the endogenous timing. Bárcena‐Ruiz and Garzón () and Matsumura and Ogawa () pointed out that simultaneous moves may occur under a mixed duopoly with semipublic and a domestic private firms in the linear economy.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs

Kawasaki

Ohkawa

Okamura

2020

Australian Economic Papers

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This study examines a timing game in a mixed duopoly wherein public and private firms compete by taking account of the increasing marginal cost of both firms, as well as partial foreign ownership of the private firm.This study finds that if the private firm has a strong cost advantage over the public firm, public leadership is a risk dominant equilibrium irrespective of foreign ownership ratio. This result means that the cost difference between the public and private firms matters in selecting the risk-dominant equilibrium of the timing game. Additionally, if the private firm has only a weak cost advantage over the public firm, then private leadership (public leadership) is the risk dominant equilibrium if the foreign ownership ratio is (not) small. K E Y W O R D Sasymmetric increasing marginal costs, mixed duopoly, partial foreign ownership, risk-dominant equilibrium

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confidence: 99%

“…Bárcena‐Ruiz and Garzón () and Matsumura and Ogawa () pointed out that simultaneous moves may occur under a mixed duopoly with semipublic and a domestic private firms in the linear economy. Naya () introduced partial privatisation rate into a differentiated Cournot duopoly, and showed if the privatisation rate is low (medium), then (R1) ((R3)) holds.…”

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confidence: 99%

Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs

Kawasaki

Ohkawa

Okamura

2020

Australian Economic Papers

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“…See Gil‐Moltó, Poyago‐Theotoky, and Zikos (), Andree (), Nie (), Naya () and Xing, Tan, and Wang ().…”

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Environmental R&D and privatization in a mixed duopoly market

et al. 2019

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The study examines strategic environmental research and development (ER&D) under environmental tax in a mixed duopoly and further analyzes the impact of privatization on it. We show that the environmental tax may not necessarily promote the private (or public) firm's ER&D, and the relative ER&D performance between firms depends on the public firm's environmental attitudes and the tax rate. When the public firm cares much for environment, it can be used as an instrument to correct the private firm's underinvestment (or overinvestment) in ER&D. Moreover, privatization can (cannot) raise both firms' ER&D simultaneously if the tax rate is high (low).

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“…1 Besides understanding these conflicting results, recent concerns over environmental quality 1 Lu (2006), Lu and Poddar (2009) and Heywood and Ye (2009) extended the analysis into a mixed market where a public firm competes with domestic and foreign private firms and obtained similar results. For more extensive analysis, see Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2010), Tomaru and Kiyono (2010), Balogh and Tasnadi (2012), Amir and Feo (2014), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), Naya (2015) and Din and Sun (2016) among others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, EU countries lead the development of environmental policies for the sustainability in a warming planet and have a non-negligible presence of public enterprises in energy-consuming industries such as transportation and automobile industries. More related descriptions can be found in Wang and Wang (2009), Pal and Saha (2014, 2015 and Xu, et al (2016). 3 Several researchers have recently analyzed the environmental concerns of a mixed market.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes

Lee

2017

J. Econ.

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This paper examines an endogenous timing game in product differentiated duopolies under price competition when emission tax is imposed on environmental externality. We show that a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome can be an equilibrium outcome in a private duopoly under significant (insignificant) environmental externality, but this result can be reversed in a mixed duopoly. We also show that when environmental externalities are significant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and that public leadership is more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium outcome. Finally, we find that privatization can result in a public leader becoming a private leader, but this worsens welfare.

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Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly model

Cited by 21 publications

References 16 publications

Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs

Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs

Environmental R&D and privatization in a mixed duopoly market

Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes

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